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BEYOND BLAME-MENS REA AND REGULATORY 
CRIME 
Arthur Leavens· 
"A VEXATIOUS PROBLEM" 
On the surface, the issue seems quite straightforward. Congress enacts a 
criminal statute that either has no mens rea requirement or, if it has one, is 
unclear about its reach. It thus falls to the courts to decide if Congress meant 
for the statute to impose strict liability or to provide some level of mens rea, an 
interpretive task for which courts seem to be well suited. Yet, judges continue 
to be confounded by what one has called this "vexatious problem.") 
In its century-long effort to provide guidance regarding this recurring issue, 
the Supreme Court has only confused matters, swinging from an almost cav-
alier endorsement of strict liability at the beginning of the twentieth century to a 
current willingness to find a mens rea element in virtually every statute without 
regard to its language, purpose or history. The problem stems from the Court's 
inattention to the very different role that mens rea plays in regulatory crime as 
opposed to traditional crime. Traditional mens rea, a blame-based component 
of common law crimes, has no role to play in regulatory crimes. For regulatory 
crimes, mens rea serves a notice function which is quite distinct from that of its 
blame-oriented cousin. The failure to account for this conceptual difference 
has resulted in an interpretive jurisprudence that ranges from murky to in-
coherent. 
Conventionally, mens rea is the vehicle for attributing blame and thus 
suitability for criminal conviction and punishment. As such, it is conceptually 
a part of crime, at least crimes meant to stigmatize and punish wrongful 
• Professor of Law, Western New England College School of Law. I would like to thank 
my colleagues and former colleagues Jamie Colburn, Anne Goldstein, Scott Howe, and Barry 
Stem for their encouragement and thoughtful comments on earlier drafts of this Article and 
Dean Art Gaudio for providing support and assistance for this project. 
1 See, e.g., United States v. Bronx Reptiles, Inc., 217 F.3d 82, 83 (2d Cir. 2000) (Judge 
Sack begins the court's opinion interpreting such a statute by observing, "We return in this 
appeal to a vexatious problem."). 
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conduct. As we were taught in our first year of law school, "Actus non fadt 
reum nisi mens sit rea-an act does not make one guilty unless his mind is 
guilty.,,2 But for well over a century, criminal law has reached beyond this tra-
ditional notion of crime to include a different genre, so-called regulatory crimes 
that are intended to provide incentives for extra care among those engaged in 
facially legitimate but potentially harmful activities. Because these crimes do 
not have moral content and thus are not predicated on moral blameworthiness, 
traditional blame-oriented mens rea has no conceptual role to play. However, 
this does not mean that all regulatory crimes should be crimes of strict liability. 
By requiring proof that those who may be subject to regulatory criminal statutes 
understand the nature of their conduct or the circumstances in which it occurs, 
mens rea can ensure constructive notice of this potential criminal liability. For 
particular statutes, such notice can be the difference between acceptable hard-
ship and unfair surprise. 
The background principles are familiar. If a statute is one codifying or cre-
ating a traditional crime, that is, one that prohibits and punishes morally blame-
worthy conduct (as the common law was said to do), then it is black-letter law 
that the crime includes a mental element, mens rea, and any omission of such 
an element on the face of the statute is taken to be inadvertent. The legislature 
is presumed to have intended mens rea, and it is judicially inserted into the stat-
ute absent clear legislative intent to omit it. 
On the other hand, no such presumption applies if the crime is not of the 
traditional sort but is instead a regulatory, public welfare crime, enacted to 
protect the public rather than to punish wrongdoing.3 As to such regulatory 
crimes, many courts leave the analysis at taking the statute's omission of mens 
rea at face value and interpreting the crime to be one of strict liability. But, 
there is, or should be, another step, and that is to consider whether under the 
principles of notice-not blame-mens rea ought to be inferred to guard 
2 EDWARD COKE, THE THIRD PART OF THE INSTITUTE OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 107 
(William S. Hein & Co. 1986)(1644); WAYNER. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT,JR., CRIMINAL 
LAW 212 (2d ed. 1986). 
3 This may sound like the timeworn distinction between mala in se and mala prohibita and 
some have so described it. See, e.g., HenryM. Hart, Jr., The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAW 
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 401, 419 (1958). Hart uses the distinction as descriptive shorthand in his 
discussion of blameworthiness as the foundation for criminal punishment. This distinction has 
long been criticized for its employment as a litmus test in deciding which crimes are ones of 
strict liability and which require proof of mens rea. See, e.g., JEROME HALL, GENERAL 
PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 340-41 (2d ed. 1947). 
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against unfair surprise. Mens rea should not in this analysis be presumed; the 
notice analysis presumption runs the other way. 
In gleaning the legislature's unarticulated intent concerning notice-based 
mens rea, a court should engage in the same balancing of interests that informs 
other notice issues. This analysis should be prospective and general, comparing 
the protective, societal needs advanced by the statute, on the one hand, with the 
concern that the statute might create a "trap for the innocent,'''' on the other. 
Such analysis might lead a court to conclude that the potential for unfair sur-
prise outweighs the need for excuse-free enforcement, an imbalance that for 
some statutes could be corrected by requiring proof that the actor was aware of 
some aspect of the conduct in question. Inferring a mens rea element in such a 
case, to serve the assumed interest of the legislature in a reasonable balance of 
societal need for strict enforcement against fair warning to individuals likely 
affected, would be entirely appropriate. It would not, however, be based on the 
blame-based presumption of mens rea that applies in traditional crimes. 
The Supreme Court has recognized and even employed, although not 
explicitly, such notice-based mens rea. In a series of cases that included its 
landmark decision in Lambert v. California,5 the Court moved toward an 
interpretive theory utilizing notice-based mens rea. However, this emerging 
construct abruptly ended with Liparota v. United States,6 a case in which the 
Court ignored the distinction between notice and blame as a basis for mens rea, 
reverting to the traditional but inapt presumption of blame-based mens rea to 
address the notice problems of a regulatory statute. This mix-and-match 
approach to mens rea remains with us today, and the result is a jurisprudence 
marked by confusion and, inevitably, arbitrary decision making. 
Two fairly recent circuit court cases interpreting the Federal Archaeological 
Resources Protection Ace (ARPA) provide good examples of this conceptual 
confusion. Enacted in 1979, ARPA was designed to protect against the 
plundering of America's archaeological resources, principally Native American 
artifacts in the West. 8 As is here relevant, the Act makes it a crime to 
"knowingly ... excavate, remove, damage, or otherwise alter or deface ... any 
4 United States v. Cardiff, 344 U.S. 174, 176 (1952). 
5355 U.S. 225 (1957). 
6471 U.S. 419 (1985). 
7 Archaeological Resources Protection Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 470aa-470mm (1979) (current 
version at 16 U.S.C. §§ 470aa-470mm (2000)). 
8 125 CONGo REc. H17393 (daily ed. July 9, 1979) (statement of Rep. M. Udall) (cited in 
United States v. Lynch, 233 F.3d 1139, 1142 (9th Crr. 2000)). 
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archaeological resource located on public lands . . . unless such activity is 
pursuant to a [federally issued] permit.,,9 Violators may be fined up to $10,000 
and/or imprisoned up to a year unless the value of the resource in question 
exceeds $500, in which case the potential fme and imprisonment are doubled. 10 
On its face, the statute requires proof that one charged with this crime must 
have "knowingly" excavated, removed, damaged or altered some object, but 
what other knowledge, if any, must be proven to convict? This is the question 
to which the Ninth and Tenth Circuits respectively turned in United States v. 
Lynch}} and United States v. Quarrell. 12 
Lynch was first and in some sense presented the more compelling facts. Ian 
Lynch was a young man who went deer hunting with two friends on an unin-
habited island in southeast Alaska. \3 While exploring the island, he saw, half-
buried in the ground, what appeared to be the back of an old human skull. 14 
Lynch picked it up, saw that it indeed was a skull, and took it home to try to 
learn more about it. IS Somehow the regional Forest Service learned of his 
discovery and confiscated the skull. 16 After its initial examination did not 
reveal whether the skull was sufficiently old to be a protected "archaeological 
resource" under ARPA, the Service sent it out for carbon dating, which showed 
that the skull was some 1400 years old.17 Lynch was indicted for, and ult-
imately convicted of, a felony violation of ARP A.18 He defended by claiming 
quite credibly that he did not know the age or the value of the skull and was 
thus unaware that it was either an "archaeological resource" or valued at more 
than $500.19 Of course, for this to be a cognizable defense, the statute's 
"knowingly" mens rea had to reach beyond the prohibited conduct and apply to 
"archaeological resource" and to a value "exceeding $500." 
Without deciding whether the crime was regulatory or traditional in na-
ture,20 the Ninth Circuit focused its interpretive analysis on the felony penalty 
9 16 U.S.C. § 470ee. 
10 Id. 
11 233 F.3d 1139 (9th Cir. 2000). 
12 310 F.3d 664 (lOth Cir. 2002). 




17 I d. 
18 Id. at 1140-41. 
19Id. at 1141. 
20 The court observed, "Picking up a skull is not in every case 'malum in se,' nor does 
every case 'involve the public welfare. '" Id. at 1143. Putting aside the fact that the statute 
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involved and on the potential unfairness of its application to "casual visitors" 
looking for souvenirs on public lands.21 The court's concern that the statute 
may set a trap for unwary offenders is a classic notice concern, but it is only 
half of the inquiry. Full notice analysis would also ask whether in enacting the 
statute Congress had identified particular threats to archaeological resources 
that called for strict, excuse-free enforcement. Only then would the court be in 
a position to weigh the special need for particularized warning to potential 
violators against the apparent need for strict enforcement, all in an effort to 
decide what Congress intended to be the reach of the statute's "knowledge" 
requirement. However, the Ninth Circuit engaged in no such notice analysis. 
Having identified what it believed to be the potential for unfair surprise, the 
court simply stated that "the presumption in favor of a scienter requirement 
should apply to each of the statutory elements that criminalize otherwise in-
nocent conduct. ,,22 The court thus addressed its notice concern through the 
application of the common law, blame-based mens rea presumption, holding 
that the statute required proof that Lynch knew, or should have known, that the 
skull was an "archaeological resource" as a predicate to his conviction?3 
That this was a notice-driven decision seems underscored by the court's 
imposition of an objective limitation to the statute's "knowingly" provision, 
including within its reach not only those proven to have known ofthe artifact's 
character but also those who "should have known," thereby addressing enforce-
ment concerns. This extension of "knowingly" to the archaeological character 
of the object in question, limited by an objective overlay, may be the ap-
propriate way to read the statute if all of the notice factors had been considered. 
However, one is left to wonder whether, had Lynch been a back-hoe-operating 
poacher at whom the legislation was aimed rather than a curious visitor to the 
island, the court would have been so quick to afford a mistake-of-fact defense 
through its mens rea analysis. By employing the inapt presumption of mens 
rea instead of openly engaging in the appropriate notice analysis, the court 
leaves us to guess at the factors that ultimately drove its decision. 
prohibits more than "picking up a skull," in the end one has to decide whether the prohibition is 
regulatory or traditional, given the very different mens rea presumptions that depend on that 
distinction. The focus should be on the statute as a whole, not on the single act at issue in the 
matter at hand. Picking up a human skull might look very different than picking up a stray 
arrowhead or shard of pottery when trying to decide the nature of the prohibition which applies 
equally to both. 
21 Id. at 1142-46. 
22 Id. at 1144. 
23Id. at 1145-46. 
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Quarrell,24 decided by the Tenth Circuit two years later, presents a little 
different twist to interpreting this statute. In Quarrell, the issue was not 
whether the statute's requirement of "knowingly" applied to whether the object 
taken or disturbed was an "archaeological resource," but whether it applied to 
the circumstance that the act occurred on "public land. ,,25 After determining 
that neither the language of the statute nor its legislative history definitively an-
swered that question, the court turned to what was essentially notice analysis, 
considering issues of both fair warning and governmental enforcement needs.26 
The court then concluded that Congress intended the "public land" element to 
be primarily jurisdictional, and thus that Congress did not intend for the stat-
ute's knowledge requirement to apply to it.27 Jurisdictional elements are ordi-
narily strict liability, and so it would seem that the defendant could not defend 
by claiming a mistake concerning the character of the land from which he took 
the artifacts.28 
This analysis is quite defensible even ifnot explicitly a notice-based con-
struct. However, the opinion did not end there. The court went on to hold that 
the defendant could nevertheless present a mistake-of-fact defense based on his 
belief (1) that he was excavating on private, not public, land and (2) that he had 
permission to do SO?9 In the words of the court: 
After the government establishes an ARPA violation, the defendant should be 
allowed to argue a mistake-of-fact defense based on his reasonable belief that 
he was excavating on private land with permission. The defendant must es-
tablish that he reasonably believed that he was lawfully excavating on private 
land because such "an honest mistake of fact would not be consistent with 
criminal intent." However, if a defendant merely argues that he thought he 
was excavating on private land, such a mistake of fact would not negate 
criminal intent because such conduct is unlawful. 30 
24 United States v. Quarrell, 310 F.3d 664 (10th Cir. 2002). 
25 Id. at 668. 
26Id. at 670-74. 
27Id. at 674. 
28 See United States v. Yerrnian, 468 U.S. 63, 68-70 (1984) (holding that the statutory 
terms "knowingly" and "willfully" in 18 U.S.c. § 1001 (1948) (current version at Pub. L. No. 
109-248, 120 Stat. 603 (2006)), forbidding false statements to federal agents, were not intended 
by Congress to apply to the element "in any matter within the jurisdiction of any department or 
agency of the United States" because the "primary purpose [of this element] is to identifY the 
factor that makes the false statement an appropriate subject for federal concern"). 
29 Quarrell, 310 F.3d at 675. 
30Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis in original). 
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This is classic common law analysis. Having decided that the specified 
mens rea requirement of "knowingly" did not apply to the element of "public 
land," the court nevertheless presumed the existence of general criminal intent, 
which flows from the notion that to be punished one must be proven to be 
blameworthy. Under the common law, only a reasonable mistake which would, 
as an objective matter, leave the actor believing that he was acting lawfully, that 
is, within the shared moral code, would relieve him of that blame and thus in-
eligible for moral censure or punishment.31 
Both cases, then, end with the same result, although the ostensible holdings 
vary, Lynch holding that "knowingly" applies to the element of "archaeological 
resource,,,32 and Quarrell holding that "knowingly" does not apply to the 
element of "public lands.,,33 Yet, in both the bottom line is that the defendant 
can successfully defend through-but only through-a reasonable mistake con-
cerning the element in question. If these cases and their respective analytic 
flaws were anomalies, they would not be worthy of mention, but they are not. 
Rather, they are representative of a more general tendency to conflate blame-
worthiness and notice issues. The result has been confusion at best, man-
ipulation at worst. 
The goal of this Article is to unravel this skein. In the first part, I will 
briefly outline the conceptual underpinnings of the common law approach to 
mens rea, with its blame focus, and the Supreme Court's early efforts to 
develop a different approach in interpreting regulatory criminal statutes. The 
second part begins with Lambert v. California, in which the Court staked out 
the constitutional limits for the employment of strict liability in public welfare 
or regulatory crimes, and, more importantly for our purposes, first employed 
notice-based mens rea.34 This part goes on to examine the ensuing cases in 
which the Court, at least implicitly, fleshes out the notice analysis that should 
guide the courts in deciding whether Congress intended strict liability or some 
level of mens rea in enacting regulatory criminal statutes. The third part begins 
with Liparota v. United States, the case in which the Court departed from the 
emerging construct, which had distinguished blame-based and notice-based 
mens rea.35 This part then charts the doctrinal confusion that has resulted from 
this conflation of blame and notice in the Court's mens rea analysis, confusion 
31 See infra pp. 8-11. 
32 United States v. Lynch, 233 F.3d 1139 (9th Cir. 2000). 
33 Quarrell, 310 F .3d at 664. 
34 355 U.S. 225 (1957). 
35 471 U.S. 419 (1985). 
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that is apparent not only in its own cases but also those of the circuit courts as 
they confront this "vexatious problem." 
THE LIMITS OF BLAME 
Any attempt to determine the limits of blame in our criminal law must 
begin with the common law and its understanding that criminal punishment 
was reserved for the morally blameworthy. This fusion of moral and legal 
norms may seem an anathema to twenty-fIrst century lawyers, but eighteenth-
century English judges and lawyers understood "moral" as a normative concept 
based on a society's secular sense of the divide between the "virtuous [and the] 
criminal . . . such as is known or admitted in the general business of life. ,,36 
36 SAMUEL JOHNSON, DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (Times Books, London 
1979) (1755). In his authoritative, then-contemporary Dictionary of the English Language, 
Johnson went on to amplify this definition of "moral" thusly: 
Id. 
Relating to the practice of men towards each other, as it may be virtuous or criminal, 
good or bad. 
Keep at least within the compass of moral actions, which have in them vice or 
virtue. Hooker, b. ii. 
In moral actions divine law helpeth exceedingly the law of reason to guide man's 
life, but in the supernatural it alone guideth. Hooker, b. i. 
Popular; such as is known or admitted in the general business of life. 
Mathematical things are capable of the strictest demonstration; conclusions in 
natural philosophy are capable of proof by an induction of experiments; things of a 
moral nature by moral arguments, and matters of fact by credible testimony. 
Tillotson's Sermons. 
A moral universality is when the predicate agrees to the greatest part of the 
particulars which are contained under the universal subject Watts's Logick. 
In his influential treatise, Blackstone sounded a similar note. In writing about crimes 
"against private subjects," the core of what we regard as common law crimes, Blackstone 
distinguished them from purely private wrongs for which compensation could be sought: 
[T]he wrongs, which we are now to treat of, are of a much more extensive 
consequence; I. Because it is impossible they can be committed without a violation of 
the laws of nature; of the moral as well as political rules of right: 2. Because they 
include in them almost always a breach of the public peace: 3. Because by their 
example and evil tendency they threaten and endanger the subversion of all civil 
society. Upon these accounts it is, ... the government also calls upon the offender to 
submit to public punishment for the public crime. 
4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 176-77 (1765). 
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When common law judges applied and thus elaborated the criminal law 
through the adjudicative process, they saw themselves as doing nothing more 
than giving formal recognition to behavioral norms already operative as a 
matter of societal consensus.37 Those who acted contrary to those norms were 
37 So, in his treatise, The History of the Common Law, Sir Matthew Hale first notes that all 
matters criminal "are determinable by common law, and not otherwise." 1 MATIHEW HALE, 
THE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 64 (5th ed. 1794). Turning to "the formal constituents, as I 
may call them, of the common law," Hale points to "USAGE AND CUSTOM" (relating principally 
to civil and canon law), parliamentary authority (which he here limits to "those constitutions 
and laws being made before time of memory, [which] do now obtain, and are taken as part of 
the common law and immemorial customs of the kingdom"), and "JUDICIAL DECISIONS." Id. at 
139-41. In expounding on the role of judges in crafting the common law, Hale is careful. He 
writes: 
It is true, the decisions of the courts of justice, though by virtue of the laws of this 
realm they do bind, as a law between the parties thereto, as to the particular case in 
question, till reversed by error or attaint; yet they do not make a law, properly so 
called, for only the king and parliament can do; yet they have great weight and 
authority in expounding, declaring, and publishing what the law of this kingdom is; 
especially when such decisions hold a consonancy and congruity with resolutions and 
decisions of former times. And though such decisions are less than law, yet they are a 
greater evidence thereof that the opinion of any private persons .... 
Now judicial decisions, as far as they refer to the laws of this kingdom, are for the 
matter of them of three kinds. 
First, they are either such as have their reasons singly in the laws and customs of the 
kingdom .... And in these things, the law or custom of the realm is the only rule and 
measure to judge by; and in reference to those matters, the decisions of courts are the 
conservatories and evidences of those laws. 
Secondly, or they are such decisions, as by way of deduction and illation upon those 
laws, are framed or deduced .... And herein the rule of decision is, first, the common 
law and custom of the realm, which is the great substratum that is to be maintained; 
and then authorities or decisions of former times, in the frame or the like cases; and 
then the reason of the thing itself (Note p: This force of decision is called 
'praeteritorum memoria eventorum. '). 
Thirdly, or they are such as seem to have no other guide but the common reason of 
the thing, unless the same point has been formally decided. 
Id. at 142-43. 
Two centuries later, in what by then may have been the beginning of a rear-guard action, 
influential American commentator Joel Bishop defended the common law against the emerging 
suggestion that it reflected no more than the "individual fancies" of judges. So, Bishop wrote: 
But, said a learned judge, "every nation must of necessity have its common law, let it 
be called by what name it may; and it will be simple or complicated in its details as 
society is simple or complicated in its relations." (citing Justice Turley in Jacob v. S. 
in 22 Tenn. 3 Hum. 493, 514--15 (1842) (Turley, J.)). And however some deprecate 
what they term arbitrary power in judges, who decide causes upon laws not written in 
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behaving at once immorally and unlawfully; the common law made no dis-
tinction between these two concepts.38 One who breached such a norm was by 
defmition morally blameworthy and thus merited the formal censure of criminal 
conviction and punishment. 39 It naturally followed that if the actor was mis-
taken concerning the circumstances that made the actor's conduct immoral and 
thus illegal-for example, a man mistakenly believed that his sexual partner 
consented to sexual intercourse in what otherwise was a rape---he would not be 
morally blameworthy, at least if his mistake was reasonable40 and the 
circumstances as he believed them to be did not make his act morally blame-
worthy. 41 To modem ears, limiting the doctrine of mistake with reference to 
the statute-books, such justice is necessary among every people, whether calling 
themselves free or not. 
Our tribunals commit many more errors by refusing to deal out the justice which the 
general principles of our jurisprudence and the collective conscience of mankind 
confessedly demand-alleging in excuse the want of a statute or a precedent-than in 
all other ways combined. Not thus was it anciently, when the courts of our English 
ancestors decided controversies with but few statutes and precedents to aid them; 
deriving principles for their decisions from the known usages of the country, and from 
what they found written by God in the breasts of men. And because it was not thus 
formerly, it should not be now. For by admitted doctrine, the judges should not 
decide from their individual fancies, but by the law as they find it; and we see that the 
law, as judges find it, commands them to go in proper cases outside the statutes and 
prior decisions, for principles on which to adjudicate the particular matter before 
them. 
1 JOEL PRENTISS BISHOP, NEW COMMENTARIES ON THE CRIMINAL LAW UPON A NEW SYSTEM OF 
LEGAL ExposmoN 8-9 (8th ed. 1892) (internal citation omitted). 
38 See supra notes 36 & 37. See also Gerhard Mueller, On Common Law Mens Rea, 42 
MINN. L. REv. 1043, 1058 nn.45-46 (1958). 
39 See Mueller, supra note 38, at 1058. 
40 Jerome Hall noted and criticized this objective limitation to the availability of the 
mistake-of-fact defense in Anglo-American criminal law. HALL, supra note 3, at 366-72. See 
also Edwin R. Keedy, Ignorance and Mistake in Criminal Law, 22 liARv. L. REv. 75, 83-85 
(1908). 
41 See, e.g., Regina v. Prince, L.R. 2 Cr. Cas. Res. 154 (1875). Prince, of course, is the oft-
cited case in which the English Court for Crown Cases Reserved denied a mistake-of-fact 
defense to the accused, not because his mistake was unreasonable but because his act-in the 
circumstances as he mistakenly believed them to be-was morally wrong. Id. Prince had been 
convicted for taking an unmarried girl under the age of sixteen out of the possession of her 
father, in violation of a statute forbidding such conduct. Id. Although the girl was at the time 
fourteen, Prince mistakenly, reasonably so according to the jury, believed her to be eighteen, 
thus, outside the reach of the statute. Id. Such a reasonable mistake off act would ordinarily 
exculpate, but the court affirmed Prince's conviction on the ground that it was morally wrong, 
though not forbidden under the statute, so to act. Id. Moral norms, even those not formally 
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moral standards violates the concept oflegality,42 but at a time in which there 
was no practical distinction between moral norms-understood as behavioral 
norms supported by societal consensus-and legal rules, such absolution made 
perfect sense. A mistaken actor who, because of his reasonable mistake (a mis-
take anyone could make), did not appreciate the normative content of his or her 
conduct was not blameworthy, and thus could not fairly be subjected to con-
demnation and punishment for that conduct. 43 
reduced to "law" by statute or judicial precedent, nevertheless marked the bounds between 
criminality and lawful behavior. See also Keedy, supra note 40, at 83-84. 
42 See, e.g., JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 171 (4th ed. 2006). 
43 In addressing the question of who should be punished and who should be excused for 
committing an act forbidden by the criminal law, Blackstone reduces this issue to: 
[T]his single consideration, the want or defect of will . ... [T]he concurrence ofthe 
will, when it has its choice either to do or to avoid the fact in question, [is] the only 
thing that renders human actions either praiseworthy or culpable. Indeed, to make a 
complete crime cognizable by human laws there must be both a will and an act. 
4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 36, at 20-21 (emphasis in original). 
Blackstone identified six defects of will that could be said to affect an actor's culpability-
infancy, lunacy, drunkenness, misfortune or chance, ignorance or mistake, and necessity. As to 
instances in which "a man commits an unlawful act by misfortune or chance, and not by 
design .... [h]ere the will observes a total neutrality, and does not co-operate with the deed; 
which therefore wants one main ingredient of a crime." Id. at 20-21 (emphasis in original). He 
refines the point, distinguishing between "accidental mischief [that] happens to follow the 
performance ofa lawful act," which excuses the actor, and the case in which "a man be doing 
anything unlawful, and a consequence ensues which he did not foresee or intend, as the death of 
a man or the like," which "shall be no excuse; for, being guilty of one offense, in doing 
antecedently what is in itself unlawful, he is criminally guilty of whatever consequence may 
follow the first misbehaviour." Id. at 26-27 (citation omitted). Turning to "ignorance or 
mistake," Blackstone writes 
when a man, intending to do a lawful act, does that which is unlawful. ... [T]he deed 
and the will act[] separately, [and] there is not that conjunction between them, which 
is necessary to form a criminal act. But this must be an ignorance or mistake off act, 
an not an error in point oflaw. 
Id. at 27. See also 1 HALE, supra note 37, at 14-16,38-39,42. 
Similarly, Bishop wrote: 
If a case is really criminal, if the end sought is punishment and not the redress of a 
private wrong, no circumstances can render it just, or consistent with a sound 
jurisprudence, for the court or a jury to condemn the defendant unless he was guilty in 
his mind. As the laws of the material world act uniformly, never knowing exceptions, 
so do those of the moral world. It is never right to punish a man for walking 
circumspectly in the path which appears to be laid down by the law, even though 
some fact which he is unable to discover renders the appearance false .... And a court 
should in all circumstances so interpret both the common law and the statutes as to 
avoid this wrong. 
BISHOP, supra note 37, at 164. 
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Moral blameworthiness, the necessary, common law predicate to criminal 
conviction and punishment, thus boiled down to a failure to conform one's 
conduct to consensus behavioral norms in circumstances in which the average 
person would understand that the behavior was wrong.44 Since the reach of 
such criminal laws was thus intuitive to judges and citizens alike, concerns 
about notice and knowledge of the law were nonexistent. 45 The notion of mala 
in se had meaning.46 A sensible corollary of this approach limited this blame-
based punishment to common law crimes. Moral blame had no application to 
44 This moral blameworthiness was the minimum level of culpability necessary to 
criminality. Many common law crimes, of course, had the added requirement of a specific 
intent that must have animated the criminal act, the ordinary effect of which was to increase the 
severity of the crime. So, burglary required not only a nighttime breaking and entering of a 
dwelling house, but also the intent to commit a felony therein. 1 HALE, supra note 37, at 549. 
Larceny required the taking and carrying away of the personal goods of another, with felonious 
intent, id. at 504, felonious intent meaning the intent to convert to one's own use the goods so 
taken. Id. at 508--09. Otherwise, the taking was "at most a trespass." Id 
4S Henry Hart makes this point, noting that to the extent that formal criminal norms are 
congruent with "community attitudes and needs ... knowledge of wrongfulness can fairly be 
assumed." Hart, supra note 3, at 413. Hart goes on, "For any member of the community who 
does these things without knowledge that they are criminal is blameworthy, as much for his lack 
of knowledge as for his actual conduct." Id. See also Mueller, supra note 38, at 1058. 
46 It is worth repeating that this approach to an actor's mens rea, his "vicious will" in 
Blackstone's words, 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 36, at 21, was not purely SUbjective but was 
instead a somewhat limited, objective measure of the actor's state of mind. As Professor Gerald 
Leonard points out, "vicious" (or, "vitious") did not in Blackstone's time "have the modem 
connotation that 'vicious' now bears, reflecting the savage malignity or cruelty of an act." 
Gerald Leonard, Towards a Legal History of American Criminal Theory: Culture and Doctrine 
from Blackstone to the Model Penal Code, 6 BUFF. CRIM. L. REv. 691, 713-14 (2003). Rather, 
Leonard suggests that Blackstone sought only to describe a state of mind that reflected a 
departure by the actor from social norms as a basis for attributing fault to the actor for indulging 
his private interests "in derogation of the exacting discipline of public virtue," not some more 
evil state of mind that we might associate with the word "vicious." 
Similarly, in setting out what he called the "universal" requirement of culpability as a 
predicate to criminal punishment, Bishop wrote "[i]t is never right to punish a man for walking 
circumspectly in the path which appears to be laid down by the law, even though some fact 
which he is unable to discover renders the appearance false." 1 BISHOP, supra note 37, at 164. 
More broadly, our criminal law has a long tradition of departing from a purely subjective 
standard of blame, even in very serious offenses. Quite beyond the effective imposition of strict 
liability for felonies such as statutory rape and bigamy, defenses to homicide such as necessity, 
self defense, insanity and intoxication are routinely excluded or limited in availability for 
reasons of policy or expediency. See Louis Bilionis, Process, the Constitution, and Subsatntive 
Criminal Law, 96 MICH. L. REv. 1269, 1279-82 (1998) for an excellent discussion of this issue 
and the larger question of the constitutional status of substantive criminal law. 
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violations of decrees of a "rightful authority" independent of the moral code, 
that is, "positive" prohibitions deemed to be mala prohibita.47 
As quaint as this construct seems today,48 its core remains with us. Crimes 
are now, of course, creatures of statute, but much of our criminal law has de-
scended from the common law. And while we are a far more heterogeneous so-
ciety than was eighteenth-century England, these common law prohibitions-
e.g., murder, rape, arson, theft, assault-for the most part still represent the core 
of our moral norms. The traditional view that such crimes have moral content 
thus continues, and one who violates such norms is morally blameworthy-and 
for that reason a fit subject for censure and punishment-so long as he under-
stood, or should have understood, the circumstances that made his act criminal. 
In this view, mens rea is as critical to proof of criminality as the act itself; only 
through its proof can a harmful act be regarded as blameworthy.49 
While eighteenth-century criminal law included utilitarian decrees pro-
hibiting conduct that was not regarded as immoral, 50 today there are many, 
47 I BLACKSTONE, supra note 36, at 57-58. Crimes that are "malum prohibitum" are 
without "moral offense, or sin" and involve no "moral guilt." 
48 See HALL, supra note 3, at 338-42, and Stuart P. Green, Why It's a Crime to Tear the 
Tag off a Mattress: Overcriminalization and the Moral Content of Regulatory Offenses, 46 
EMORY L.J. 1533, 1570-74 (1997) for criticisms of this mala in selmalum prohibitum 
distinction. 
49 Over fifty years ago, Justice Jackson's classic opinion in Morissette v. United States made . 
this point. In affirming that federal criminal law presumed an element of mens rea, at least in 
those crimes rooted in common law, Justice Jackson wrote: 
The contention that an injury can amount to a crime only when inflicted by intention 
is no provincial or transient notion. It is as universal and persistent in mature systems 
oflawas belief in freedom ofthe human will and a consequent ability and duty of the 
normal individual to choose between good and evil. 
342 U.S. 246, 250 (1952). Even a committed consequentialist such as Oliver Wendell Holmes 
famously conceded that blameworthiness is a necessary predicate to criminal punishment, 
stating that "a law which punished conduct which would not be blameworthy in the average 
member ofthe community would be too severe for that community to bear." OLIVER WENDELL 
HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 50 (1881). Much, much has been written in the fifty or so 
years since Morissette about the central role of blameworthiness in American criminal law, not 
the least of which has been the work of Henry Hart, Herbert Wechsler and Herbert Packer, and, 
of course, the ALI's Model Penal Code that grew out of that work and the work of others. See 
generally Sanford Kadish, Fifty Years of Criminal Law: An Opinionated Review, 87 CAL. L. 
REv. 943 (1999) for an incisive summary of that impossibly large field of scholarship. For the 
modest purposes of this paper, it is enough here to say that blame lies at the heart of traditional 
notions of crime and punishment. 
so See I BLACKSTONE, supra note 36, at 57-58 (citing as examples of such laws "which 
enjoin only positive duties ... without any intermixture of moral guilt" statutes for preserving 
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many more, particularly at the federal level. With the coming of the industrial 
revolution and the advent of both relatively dangerous manufacturing processes 
and anonymous, mass distribution of foodstuffs and drugs, legislatures sought 
to protect the public by enacting a genre of crime characterized first as "public 
welfare"sl or "regulatory" crimes, later broadened to include what some have 
described as "public danger" or "public menace" crimes.52 Others have written 
extensively, and often critically, about this phenomenon,s3 and I will not 
duplicate that effort here. Although there is substantial variation among these 
crimes, it seems fair to describe them as regulatory measures designed pre-
emptively to avoid possible widespread harms perpetrated by persons generally 
in control of potentially dangerous processes or items. Early on, these crimes 
were for the most part discrete legislative efforts to prevent potential harm,s4 
but increasingly they have been enacted as part of broad regulatory programs, 
designed to put teeth into the regulatory effort by allowing either administrative 
or criminal sanctions against the offender.55 For example, the federal criminal 
code includes or has included crimes that forbid shipping in interstate 
commerce food that has been exposed to rodent contamination and thereby 
game, "for exercising trades without serving an apprenticeship, for not burying the dead in 
woolen, for not performing statute-work on public roads"). 
51 Francis Sayre, in his classic work, Public Welfare Offenses, seems to have coined this 
phrase. See Francis Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses, 33 COLUM. L. REv. 55,56 (1933). 
52 See, e.g., Joseph E. Kennedy, Making the Crime Fit the Punishment, 51 EMORY L.J. 753, 
764 (2002). 
53 Beginning with Sayre's measured warning that punishment without fault should be 
limited to minor crimes involving little or no punishment, see Sayre, supra note 51, at 78-83, 
the commentary over the past three-quarters of a century generally has been critical of this 
application of the criminal law, see, e.g., HALL, supra note 3, at 345-51,374-75, sometimes 
harshly so. See, e.g., Hart, supra note 3, at 422 ("It is submitted that there can be no moral 
justification for [criminal punishment without fault], and that there is not, indeed, even a 
rational, amoral justification."). See also Kadish, supra note 49; John Shepard Wiley, Jr., Not 
Guilty by Reason of Blamelessness: Culpability in Federal Criminal Interpretation, 85 VA. L. 
REv. 1021 (1999). 
54 Sayre describes and catalogs this development, see Sayre, supra note 51, at 62-67, 
summarizing these early crimes as ones falling into eight categories: (1) illegal sales of 
intoxicating liquor, (2) sales of impure or adulterated food or drugs, (3) sales of misbranded 
articles, (4) violations of anti narcotic acts, (5) criminal nuisances, (6) violations of traffic laws, 
(7) violations of motor vehicle laws, and (8) violations of general police regulations, passed for 
the safety, health or well-being of the community. Sayre, supra note 51, at 73. 
55 The Federal Archaeological Resources Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 470aa-47Omm (1979) (current 
version at 16 U.S.C. §§ 470aa-470mm (2000», discussed supra pp. 3-7, is as good an example 
as any. So, too, is the federal statute criminally punishing violations of the regulations ofthe 
Interstate Commerce Commission, see 18 U.S.C. § 834(a) (1960) (repealed 1979), discussed 
infra pp. 25-28, 36-39. See Green, supra note 48, at 1544-45 (cataloging examples of such 
crimes). 
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"may have been rendered injurious to health,,,56 shipping in interstate com-
merce any drug "that is adulterated or misbranded,,,57 possessing an un-
registered "firearm" (defined in the statute as a limited class of highly 
dangerous military weapons, such as automatic rifles and hand grenades),58 
"structuring" cash deposits in a bank in amounts less than $10,000,59 and acting 
in violation ofInterstate Commerce Commission regulations60 and in violation 
of food stamp regulations.61 
Concerns about nationwide grocery chains with warehouses in which there 
are mice, drug wholesalers that repackage and ship drugs (including over-the-
counter drugs) with incorrect labels, persons who possess unregistered 
automatic rifles, persons who break up bank deposits into smaller amounts to 
avoid reporting requirements, companies or persons who ship chemicals with 
incorrect labels or shippers oftoxic chemicals who do not take the safest route, 
and persons who possess food stamps without federal authorization are real. 
However, none of these acts seem to be "wrongful" as a matter of societal 
consensus.62 Putting aside the legal prohibition, it thus does not seem that one 
who so acts is morally blameworthy and therefore properly subject to formal 
condemnation and punishment. The essence of such crimes is not harm caused 
but conduct--conduct that could result in widespread harm, by persons or 
entities that are best positioned to reduce or eliminate that possibility of harm 
through use of proper care. These crimes are purely preventive, their aim being 
generally to impose a heightened duty of care on such actors and thus prevent 
56 21 U.S.C. § 342 (1968) (current version at Pub. L. No. 107-188, 116 Stat. 673 (2005». 
See United States v. Park, 421 U.s. 658 (1975). 
57 21 U.S.C. § 331(1941)(current version at Pub. L. No. 108-282, 118 Stat. 902 (2005». 
See United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277 (1943). 
58 26 U.S.C. § 5861 (1968) (current version at 26 U.S.C. § 5861 (2000». See United 
States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601 (1971). 
59 31 U.S.C. § 5324(d) (1988, Supp. IV) (current version at Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 
323,334,335 (2001». See United States v. Ratzlaf, 510 U.S. 135 (1994). 
60 18 U.S.c. § 834(f) (I 958)(repealed 2004). See United States v. Int'I Minerals & Chern. 
Corp., 402 U.S. 558 (1971). 
61 7 U.S.C. § 2024(b)(I) (current version at 7 U.S.C. § 2024(b)(I) (2000». See Liparota v. 
United States, 471 U.S. 419 (1985). 
62 See Hart, supra note 3, at 420; Green, supra note 48, at 1573 (quoting Hart for the 
proposition that for such crimes, "'the moral standards of the community' are simply not 
relevant"). 
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the hann or reduce the likelihood that it will occur. These are not crimes im-
bued with blame.63 
To be sure, ifhann actually occurs, hann that can be linked back to such 
conduct, the actors may be subject to recrimination and blame. Then the con-
duct becomes the act of causing that hann, which may well constitute an ele-
ment of a crime with moral content. For example, there may be some level of 
homicide if someone dies from contaminated food or mislabeled drugs distrib-
uted by the actor, or fraud if the unauthorized possessor offood stamps cashes 
them in. The so-called regulatory crime is the act, or failure to act, in particular 
circumstances; actually causing the hann guarded against is not an element of 
these crimes.64 Given that blame plays no conceptual role in such purely 
63 See ALAN BRUDNER, AGENCY AND WELFARE IN THE PENAL LAW, IN ACTION AND VALUE 
IN THE CRIMINAL LAW 21, 43 (Stephen Shute et al. eds., 1993) ("Accordingly, the doctrine of 
mens rea has no role to play in the theoretical account of punishment within the welfare 
paradigm; it is not part of an account of the inner necessity and deservedness of punishment, 
because there is here no inner necessity or deservedness to comprehend."); Kyron Huigens, The 
Dead End of Deterrence, and Beyond, 41 WM. & MARy L. REv. 943, 945 (2000) ("Fault is an 
irreducibly retrospective concept, and the inveterately prospective orientation of deterrence 
theory's underlying consequentialism cripples its efforts to give an adequate account of fault. "); 
See a/so Green, supra note 48, at 1547 (setting out a "roadmap to moral content in the criminal 
law"). Green's purpose, however, is to evaluate the moral content of violating a formal norm, 
that is, whether it is immoral to violate a criminal statute. I make the different point that there is 
a set of crimes-regulatory or "public welfare" in nature--that forbid conduct that is not as a 
matter of consensus societal norms immoral. I do not claim that all regulatory crimes can be so 
characterized---conduct which violates the Clean Water Act, to take an example, may well be 
immoraI-but there are criminal laws which forbid and punish conduct which is not otherwise 
wrong, and is in Sayre's words, "a new type of twentieth century regulatory measure involving 
no moral delinquency." Sayre, supra note 51, at 67; Hart, supra note 3, at 420 (characterizing 
such crimes as not involving the "moral standards of the community"). 
64 Sayre characterized this preventive approach to public protection by criminally enforcing 
regulations as "wholesale" criminal enforcement, as opposed to what he called "true crimes," 
with their emphasis on individual guilt for intentional harm doing. Sayre, supra note 51, at 68-
69. The common law, of course, did not always require harm as an element of crime. Although 
slow to "take the will for the deed," and thus to punish attempts as if successfully accomplished, 
THEODORE F. T. PLUCKNElT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF TIlE COMMON LAw 453-54 (5th ed. 1956), 
the common law recognized the crime of attempt. See BISHOP, supra note 37, at 438-39. But 
such inchoate common law crimes required proof of the specific intent to cause the attempted 
harm and an act "toward the doing, sufficient both in magnitude and in proximity to the fact 
intended, to be taken cognizance of by the law that does not concern itself with things trivial 
and small." BISHOP, supra note 37, at 439. One may be punished at common law for 
unsuccessfully attempting a harm, but the harm must itself must be a criminal wrong against 
another, and the actor must have tried to do the harm and come close to success. In contrast, 
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prophylactic measures, there is no call for proof of mens rea to reflect 
blameworthiness. 
In a series of much-criticized decisions, the Supreme Court early on rec-
ognized this distinction between traditional, common law crime and blameless 
regulatory crime, holding in United States v. Balinfs that the Federal Narcotic 
Act of 1914 required no proof that a seller of enumerated narcotics knew the 
character of the item(s) sold66 and in United States v. Dotterweich67 that the 
Federal Food and Drug Act similarly required no proof that one who was 
involved in the distribution of misbranded drugs knew or should have known 
that they were misbranded.68 Whatever quarrel one may have with this 
acceptance of strict liability as a basis for a criminal conviction or with the 
quality of the Court's analysis,69 the basis for the Court's holdings is clear. 
Both Chief Justice Taft in Balint and Justice Frankfurter in Dotterweich 
recognized Congress's power to enact criminal prohibitions the purpose of 
which was to advance particular regulatory interests, even if it meant 
punishing "innocent," and thus blameless, persons.70 Both recognized that this 
approach was a departure from traditional common law principles in which 
"scienter was a necessary element in the indictment and proof of every crime,,71 
but held that the Due Process Clause did not forbid such imposition of criminal 
regulatory crime might punish the careless grocer for distributing potentially harmful foodstuffs, 
even though that was not his intent and the possibility of harm was remote and impersonal. 
65 258 U.S. 250 (1922). 
66 Id. at 254. 
67 320 U.S. 277 (1943). 
68Id. at 284-85. 
69 Compare Hart, supra note 3, at 431-33 (surveying the Supreme Court's mens rea 
jurisprudence through the first half of the twentieth century, Hart observes, "[f]rom beginning to 
end, there is scarcely a single opinion by any member of the Court which confronts the question 
in a fashion which deserves intellectual respect.") with Bilionis, supra note 46, at 1288-95 
(defending the Court's much-maligned decisional line from Balint through Lambert, arguing 
that, although perhaps "careless with its craft," the Court had ''valid and weighty concerns on its 
mind ha[ving] everything to do with process"). 
70 See Balint, 258 U.S. at 254 ("Congress weighed the possible injustice of subjecting an 
innocent seller to a penalty against the evil of exposing innocent purchasers to danger from the 
drug, and concluded that the latter was the result preferably to be avoided."); Dotterweich: 
Hardship there doubtless may be under a statute which thus penalizes the transaction 
though consciousness of wrongdoing be totally wanting. Balancing relative hard-
ships, Congress has preferred to place it upon those who have at least the opportunity 
of informing themselves of the existence of conditions imposed for the protection of 
consumers before sharing in illicit commerce, rather than to throw the hazard on the 
innocent public who are wholly helpless. 
320 U.S. at 284-85. 
71 Balint, 258 U.S. at 251. See Dotterweich, 320 U.S. at 281. 
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penalty without regard to blameworthiness. The limits of criminal liability 
without fault were up to the legislature. 
In Morissette v. United States,72 the Court provided an important qualifier, 
making it clear that strict liability remained the exception and not the rule and 
that statutes codifying crimes with common law roots should be presumed to 
have an element of mens rea even in the absence of explicit provision for such 
a term.73 In so holding, Justice Jackson, writing for the Court, went to great 
lengths to distinguish the faultless regulatory or "public welfare" offenses from 
the traditional, common law offenses such as larceny, a variation of which was 
there at issue. As to the latter, Jackson left little doubt as to the blame-
worthiness of such traditional crimes, observing that: 
[T]hey are invasions of rights of property which stir a sense of insecurity in 
the whole community and arouse public demand for retribution, the penalty is 
high and, when a sufficient amount is involved, the infamy is that of a felony, 
which, says Maitland, is " ... as bad a word as you can give to man or 
thing.,,74 
With blame thus at the conceptual core of such crimes, the Court held that 
more than mere omission of a mens rea term from their codification was 
necessary to infer legislative intent to impose liability without fault. 75 For 
traditional crime, an element of mens rea is presumed. 
Although it may have taken the better part of a half century for the Court to 
draw the distinction between traditional crime and regulatory crime and to point 
out the implications of this difference on the interpretation of criminal statutes, 
at least after Morissette the conceptual importance and limits of blame worth i-
ness were clear in the Court's interpretive work. The Court explicitly affirmed 
the continuing importance of blame, and thus mens rea-the basis for 
attribution of blame-as a conceptual part of traditional crime. Conversely, 
these early decisions implicitly recognized that blame (and blame-based mens 
rea) had no role to play in regulatory crime. What remained for the Court was 
the more difficult task of identifying the appropriate role of scienter in reg-
ulatory crime, that is, the notice role of mens rea. It is to that inquiry that we 
tum. 
72 342 U.S. 246 (1952). 
73/d. at 263. 
74Id. at 260 (citation omitted). 
75Id. at 263. 
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PRINCIPLES OF NOTICE 
To say that "blame" has no conceptual place in regulatory crimes does not 
mean that all such crimes should necessarily be ones of strict liability or that 
strict liability must necessarily apply to each element of such a crime.76 It 
certainly lies with the legislature to provide an explicit scienter element which 
would require proof that the accused understood the nature of her conduct and, 
if the legislature wished to go further, that she intended to engage in it. Such a 
mental element and its correlative mistake-of-fact defense, given the lack ofa 
retributive basis for the crime, should not, however, be presumed under trad-
itional mens rea analysis. Rather, as developed below, the reason in such of-
fenses to require that the prosecution prove that an accused knew or should 
have known the nature of her conduct is to ensure that she was adequately 
warned of the possibility of criminal sanction; that is, that she had adequate 
notice. 
Any such notice-based mens rea would not conceptually be an element of 
the crime, proof of which is necessary to show that the crime was committed. 
The notice claim is rather that, in spite of the accused's commission of a crime, 
the legal prohibition should not be enforced and punishment should not be 
imposed because the law which the actor violated did not give adequate 
warning of the potential for criminality. The judicial willingness to imply such 
a notice-based scienter element in a regulatory crime should thus be subject to 
the same caution which informs the judicial approach to other notice-based 
defenses, like mistake oflaw and void-for-vagueness. With notice claims, the 
presumption runs against, not in favor, of a mistake or ignorance defense. 
The principle that the state must provide fair warning of what is prohibited, 
of course, has a constitutional dimension, operating through the Ex Post Facto 
and Bill of Attainder Clauses, which together require crimes to be defined pro-
spectively and generally,77 and through the Due Process Clause, which requires 
76 See Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 607 n.3 (1994). 
77 The Constitution forbids the federal government, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3, and the 
state governments, id. § 10, cl. 1, from enacting any bill of attainder or expostJacto law. The 
former consists of special legislation providing that a particular person is criminally punishable 
without trial or conviction. See Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. 277, 325 (1867). The latter 
consists of a law which retroactively criminalizes conduct and/or aggravates punishment for a 
crime. See Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 390 (1798). 
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these prospective general commands to be relatively clear in their meaning.78 
Two interrelated concerns underlie this basic notice concept. First, individuals 
who are potentially liable for criminal punishment must be able to fairly predict 
what the law forbids so that they can avoid punishment if they wish. Second,-
law enforcement officials need clear guidance concerning the content and 
purpose of the prohibitions which they must enforce in order to avoid arbitrary 
enforcement. The concern in this Article is for statutes that satisfy this consti-
tutional requirement but nevertheless might catch violators by surprise.79 The 
focus, then, is on the fair-warning aspect of notice, which some have dismissed 
as a relatively unimportant or abstract concern80 but which seems resurrected at 
least as a subconstitutional concern with the advent of widely applicable 
regulatory statutes. 
As the concerns that they address would suggest, these notice issues81 differ 
markedly from those of blameworthiness. Since the purpose is to provide guid-
ance to prospective offenders, and enforcers too, notice concerns are--or at 
least should be-general and prospective rather than individualized and retro-
spective in their focus. While blameworthiness concerns mandate a retributive 
judgment of a particular individual based on what that person chose to do, the 
notice inquiry asks whether, in the context of its likely application, a criminal 
prohibition gives reasonable warning of what conduct it prohibits. Answering 
this notice question requires balancing society's need for the prohibition as 
articulated against the general likelihood that the prohibition, so articulated, 
'will either unfairly take potential violators by surprise or give rise to arbitrary 
enforcement of its command. 
78 See, e.g., Connally v. Gen. Const. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 390 (1926). See generally John 
Calvin Jeffries, Jr., Legality, Vagueness, and the Construction of Penal Statutes, 71 VA. L. REv. 
189 (1985). 
79 Professor Jeffries points out the gap between the minimal fair-warning protection 
actually provided by conventional void-for-vagueness analysis and that facially suggested by the 
rhetoric of this doctrine. See Jeffries, supra note 78, at 205-12. See also Dan M. Kahan, Some 
Realism About Retroactive Criminal Lawmaking, 3 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REv. 95, 99-101 
(1997). 
80 See DRESSLER, supra note 42, at 47; see also Jeffries, supra note 78, at 195-96 
(discussing the void-for-vagueness doctrine as the "operational arm oflegality"); HERBERT L. 
PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 79-80 (1968). See, e.g., Connally, 269 U.S. at 
390. 
81 The focus ofthis article is on statutory interpretation and thus the discussion of notice 
will focus on statutory clarity and availability, not ex post facto and bill of attainder issues. 
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At least under traditional analysis, this notice balance favors the needs side, 
presuming, though not irrebuttably, that ignorance of the law is no excuse. 
Criminal law , both as a deterrent and as a retributive response to wrongdoing, 
requires uniform application to be effective. Allowing excuses for ignorance or 
misunderstanding of a prohibition undercuts that uniformity of response, and 
does so for reasons unrelated to either blame or deterrence. Moreover, recog-
nizing a mistake-of-Iaw defense would reduce the incentive to learn what the 
law prohibits, further undercutting the law's value as a deterrent. The rational 
actor presupposed by a deterrence theory might well, in a close case, prefer to 
act in ignorance, understanding that such ignorance may be a defense, rather 
than to inquire into the law's provisions, thereby running the risk of learning 
that the desired conduct is prohibited.82 In contrast, the fairness side of the 
notice balance when applied to traditional crimes seems to raise minimal 
concerns. Since these crimes by and large reflect a shared behavioral, if not 
moral code, the possibility seems insubstantial that an individual who commits 
such a crime could legitimately claim surprise at the prospect of punishment or 
that law enforcement officers could play on the law's ambiguity in order to 
enforce it in an arbitrary manner. Thus, the principle that ignorance ofthe law 
does not excuse runs deep in traditional criminal law, applying to both the ex-
istence of a prohibition and its meaning.83 
82 Additionally, some have argued that a claimed ignorance-of-the-Iaw defense would be 
particularly difficult to overcome by proof. Unlike "mistakes of fact," which arise in external 
circumstances that provide objective benchmarks against which to measure their bonafides and 
reasonableness, the argument posits that asserted mistakes of law are more internal and thus 
more difficult to controvert. See, e.g., 1 JOHN AUSTIN, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE 498 (R. 
Campbell ed. 1875). But see HOLMES, supra note 49, at 48 (disputing this difficulty of proof 
point and arguing that the law's unwillingness to allow an "ignorance of the law" defense rests 
solely on the need to discourage rather than encourage such ignorance). 
83 See, e.g., United States v. Int'! Minerals & Chem. Co., 402 U.S. 558, 563 (1971) 
(holding that a statute making it a crime to knowingly violate [I.C.C.] regulations permitted 
conviction even though the accused was ignorant of those regulations); Rose v. Locke, 423 U.S. 
48,49-50 (1975) (upholding against a vagueness challenge conviction for cunnilingus under a 
statute forbidding "crimes against nature," observing that "[e]ven trained lawyers may find it 
necessary to consult legal dictionaries, treatises, and judicial opinions before they may say with 
any certainty what some statutes may compel or forbid"); Boyce Motor Lines, Inc. v. United 
States, 342 U.S. 337, 345 (1952) (Jackson, 1., dissenting) (observing, with regard to a statute 
criminalizing knowing violations ofI.C.C. regulations, "I do not suppose the Court intends to 
suggest that ifpetitioner knew nothing of the existence of such a regulation its ignorance would 
constitute a defense"); Rex v. Bailey, 168 Eng. Rep. 651 (1800) (L.R.C.C.R.) (upholding 
conviction even though accused was at sea both when the statute was enacted and when he 
violated its prohibition); Rex v. Esop, 173 Eng. Rep. 203 (1836) (upholding conviction even 
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The strength of the traditional presumption that the criminal law is known 
is reflected in the narrow way in which traditional criminal law responds to a 
claim that the meaning of a prohibition is unclear, that is, the void-for-
vagueness doctrine. In deciding whether a criminal statute is acceptably clear 
in its command, courts have never required actual notice; the inquiry is not 
retrospective, focused on the understanding of the accused.84 The inquiry is 
instead prospective, deciding whether the criminal prohibition in question is 
sufficiently clear by balancing potential unfairness85 against the apparent need 
for such a provision as written.86 In its vagueness analysis, the Supreme Court 
has thus considered the nature and importance of the governmental interest ad-
vanced by the statute in question,87 the feasibility of greater precision in the 
though accused was recently arrived foreigner from country where the conduct was not illegal). 
See 1 AUSTIN, supra note 82, at 497-98; DRESSLER, supra note 42, at 177-78; 1 HALE, supra 
note 37, at 42; HOLMES, supra note 49, at 47-48. See generally HALL, supra note 3, at 323-76 
(criticizing the breadth and apparent rationale ofthe doctrine); LAP AVE & SCOTI, supra note 2, 
at 90-92, 412-16; GLANVILLE WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL LAW: THE GENERAL PART 288-93 (2nd ed., 
Stevens & Sons Ltd. 1961) (1953); Ronald A. Cass, Ignorance of the Law: A Maxim 
Reexamined, 17 WM. &MARvL. REv. 671, 671-84 (1976); BruceR. Grace, Note,Ignoranceof 
the Law as an Excuse, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 1392, 1393-96 (1986); Jeffries, supra note 78, at 
196-201,207-10; Livingston Hall & Selig Seligman, Mistake of Law & Mens Rea, 8 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 641, 643-51 (1941). 
84 See, e.g., Rose, 423 U.S. at 49-53; Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-14 
(1972); Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 453-58 (1939). In none of these decisions, 
respectively reviewing vagueness challenges to statutes forbidding "crimes against nature" 
(applied to the act of cunnilingus), "willfully mak[ing] ... any noise or diversion which disturbs 
or tends to disturb the peace or good order of[a] school session or class thereof," and being 
"known [as] a member of any gang consisting of two or more persons," did the Supreme Court 
make any reference in its notice analysis to the individual circumstances of the defendant or the 
likelihood that he or she had actual notice of the meaning of the statute or ordinance in question. 
See Jeffries, supra note 78, at 206-12. 
85 Included in this notion ofunfaimess is the concern that the statute may be creating a trap 
for the unwary by "criminaliz[ing] a broad range of apparently innocent conduct," see, e.g., 
Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 426 (1985), as well as setting up the possibility of 
arbitrary enforcement. See, e.g., City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41 (1999) (invalidating 
anti gang loitering ordinance because of the virtually unlimited discretion it afforded police in 
determining its reach). 
86 Justice Frankfurter's dissent in Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 524-26 (1948) 
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting) provides about as thoughtful yet concise a description of this tension 
between concern for fair notice and need for broad enforcement as exists. See also Jeffries, 
supra note 78, at 196-97. 
87 Compare Boyce Motor Lines, Inc. v. United States, 342 U.S. 337,341-42 (1952) 
(observing that the challenged LC.C. regulation was the result oflongstanding congressional 
concern for "protecting the public against the hazards involved in transporting explosives") with 
Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 161-62 (1972) (observing that the 
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statute's provisions,88 as well as the possibility that the statute's uncertain 
provisions might be discriminatorily applied,89 or have an adverse impact on 
fundamental rights.9o When analyzing vagueness claims aimed at statutes 
codifying traditional crimes, the Court has tolerated considerable ambiguity, 
relying on the common law origins of these prohibitions and their longstanding 
and continuing utilization in holding that their terms are acceptably clear.91 
Even here, the Court's tolerance for lack of clarity has limits, and the Court has 
thus struck down vagrancy laws when faced with considerable evidence of their 
arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.92 However, absent a compelling 
showing that an apparently vague traditional crime is unfair or arbitrarily en-
forced, the Court seems comfortable with the presumption that the command of 
crimes rooted in the common law is understood. 
This presumed knowledge of the criminal law is more problematic when 
applied to regulatory crime. If the question is whether the accused knew that 
Elizabethian social conditions which gave rise to vagrancy laws such as the ordinance there in 
question "no longer fit the facts"). 
88 Compare United States v. Petrillo, 332 U.S. 1,7-8 (1947) (stating "[c]learer and more 
precise language might have been framed by Congress to express what it meant by 'number of 
employees needed.' But none occurs to us ... effectively to carry out what appears to have 
been the congressional purpose.") with Connally v. Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 393-95 
(1926) (noting, in holding "current rate of wages" unduly vague as a criminal mandate, that "the 
vice ofthe statute here lies in the impossibility of ascertaining, by any reasonable test, that the 
legislature meant one thing rather than another .... "). 
89 Compare Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 355-58 (1983) (striking down as 
unconstitutionally vague a statute requiring loiterers and wanderers to provide "credible and 
reliable" identification on demand of the police, noting that a person stopped under the statute is 
entitled to continue to walk the public streets "only at the whim of any police officer who 
happens to stop that individual .... ") with Grayned, 408 U.S. at 108,113 (upholding ordinance 
forbidding the making of noise which ''tends to disturb the peace or good order of [a] school 
session," noting that the "antinoise ordinance does not permit punishment for the expression of 
an unpopular point of view, and it contains no broad invitation to subjective or discriminatory 
enforcement"). 
90 Compare Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 572-73 n.lO (1974) (observing, in striking 
down statute punishing one who ''treats contemptuously the flag of the United States," that 
when a prohibition "is capable of reaching expression sheltered by the First Amendment, the 
doctrine demands a greater degree of specificity than in other contexts") with Rose v. Locke, 
423 U.S. 48, 50 n.3 (1975)(observing, in upholding statute forbidding "crimes against nature," 
that "[t]his is not a case in which the statute threatens a fundamental right such as freedom of 
speech so as to call for any special judicial scrutiny" (citation omitted)). 
91 See, e.g., Rose, 423 U.S. at 50--53, discussed supra notes 83, 84 & 90. 
92 See Papachristou, 405 U.s. at 158-61, 169 n.15. See also Kolender, 461 U.S. at 355-
57. Cf City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41,60-63 (1999) (invalidating anti gang loitering 
ordinance because of the virtually unlimited discretion it afforded police in determining its 
reach). 
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the regulatory crime existed, this presumption of knowledge has raised few 
problems, given that with very few exceptions modem laws, ordinances and 
regulations which provide for criminal sanctions are published.93 However, the 
meaning and application of such regulatory crimes present more compelling 
notice issues, and virtually from the beginning of their widespread enactment, 
they were challenged as unduly vague. 
The claim was that in criminalizing the violation of regulations, many of 
which couched their mandates in such relative terms as "unjust or un-
bl "94,, I "95,, t' bl d ~ 'bl ,,96 d"~' d reasona e, usua , prac lca e an '" leaSI e, an laIr ... an ... 
normal,,,97 Congress enacted a standard of criminality that was too indefinite. 
In responding to these vagueness claims, the Supreme Court explicitly recog-
nized the balance between fairness to those likely subject to these laws and the 
need to prevent the harms at which they were aimed. When the Court upheld 
such statutes, for the most part it relied either on the inclusion in the statute of 
terms with accepted common law meaning or on the rules' application to 
entities engaged in specialized activities.98 Given such a basis for under-
93 See LAFAVE & SCOlT, supra note 2, at 416, for a concise discussion of this issue. 
94 See, e.g., United States v. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U.S. 81, 89-93 (1921). In Cohen 
Grocery, defendant's argument was couched as a violation of its right to be informed of "the 
nature and cause of the accusation" under the Sixth Amendment, but the claim was essentially 
one of statutory vagueness and was so treated by the Court. Id 
95 See, e.g., Omaechevarria v. Idaho, 246 U.S. 343, 348 (1918). 
96 See, e.g., Boyce Motor Lines, Inc. v. United States, 342 U.S. 337,338-39 (1952). 
97 See, e.g., Int'1 Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 216, 221-24 (1914). 
98 See, e.g., Omaechevarria, 246 U.S. at 346, 348 (in upholding against a vagueness 
challenge a statute criminally forbidding sheep to graze "upon any range usually occupied by 
any cattle grower," the Court observed that "[m]en familiar with range conditions and desirous 
of observing the law will have little difficulty in determining what is prohibited by it."); 
Hygrade Provision Co. v. Sherman, 266 U.S. 497, 502 (1925) (noting, in upholding against a 
vagueness challenge a statute criminally punishing the failure to label or mislabeling of kosher 
meat, that "the evidence, while conflicting, warrants the conclusion that the term 'kosher' has a 
meaning well enough defined to enable one engaged in the trade to correctly apply it, at least as 
a general thing"). See a/so, Connallyv. Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385 (1926). The Court in 
Connally summarized the vagueness approach thusly: 
The precise point of differentiation in some instances is not easy of statement; but it 
will be enough for present purposes to say generally that the decisions of the court, 
upholding statutes as sufficiently certain, rested upon the conclusion that they 
employed words or phrases having a technical or other special meaning, well enough 
known to enable those within their reach to correctly apply them or a well-settled 
common law meaning, notwithstanding an element of degree in the definition as to 
which estimates might differ, or, as broadly stated by Mr. Chief Justice White in 
United States v. Cohen Grocery Co., that, for reasons found to result either from the 
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standing, either through the language of the common law or through tenns with 
meaning to those choosing to participate in the regulated activity,99 the Court 
reasoned that the lack of certainty in the regulatory tenns was not unfair to 
those regulated. lOo Central to this constructive notice analysis, of course, was 
the obvious but not clearly articulated premise that the persons subject to such 
criminal laws appreciated the nature of their conduct, that they knew they were 
engaging in a particular field of activity. Indeed, the Court in these decisions 
took particular note if the statute which criminalized violation of a regulation 
required that the violation be "knowing"IOI or in some manner intentional. 102 It 
was careful, however, to be clear that in this notice analysis it was not reading 
the statutes to require proof that the law was actually known. 103 Such a reading 
would run afoul of the ignorance-of-the-law principle. 
A good example is Boyce Motor Lines, Inc. v. United States, 104 decided the 
same year as Morissette. If in Morissette the Court made plain its continuing 
fidelity to blame-based mens rea as a presumptive component of traditional 
crimes, in Boyce the Court reaffinned its commitment to the opposite pre-
sumption regarding knowledge of the law, even in the face ofa relatively com-
pelling void-for-vagueness, fair notice claim arising out ofa regulatory crime. 
In doing so, the Court laid the groundwork for scienter as an instrument of 
notice. 
Defendant Boyce Motor Lines was a trucking company indicted for 
knowingly violating an Interstate Commerce Commission regulation requiring 
that truckers hauling dangerous cargo such as explosives "avoid, so far as 
text of the statutes involved or the subjects with which they dealt, a standard of some 
sort was afforded. 
Id. at 391-92 (citations omitted). 
99 See, e.g., Boyce, 342 U.S. at 341-42 (noting that the trucking industry, which was 
subject to the regulations in question, had "participated extensively" in their formulation and 
drafting). 
100 See, e.g., Omaecheva"ia, 246 U.S. at 346, 348 (holding that persons "familiar with 
range conditions" would have sufficient notice as to what is meant by "range usually occupied 
by any cattle grower"); Nash v. United States, 229 U.S. 373, 376-77 (1913) (holding that the 
"common law as to the restraint of trade" was incorporated into, thereby helping to narrow and 
clarify, the Sherman Act's criminal provisions). 
101 See, e.g., Boyce, 342 U.S. at 342. 
102 See, e.g., Hygrade, 266 U.S. at SOl (1925) (rejecting vagueness challenge to a statute 
forbidding fraudulent sale of non-kosher meat as "kosher," noting that any uncertainty in the 
term "kosher" casts no unfair burden on meat sellers "since [the statutes] expressly require that 
any representation that a product is kosher must not only be false but made with intent to 
defraud"). 
103 See, e.g., Boyce, 342 U.S. at 342 n.15. 
104 342 U.S. 337. 
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practicable, and, where feasible, by prearrangement of routes, driving into or 
through congested thoroughfares, places where crowds are assembled, street car 
tracks, tunnels, viaducts,.and dangerous crossings.,,105 Boyce's drivers on three 
occasions had driven loads of explosives from upstate New York to Brooklyn 
via the Holland Tunnel, in which the last of these trips terminated with an 
explosion. The defendant trucking company argued that the regulation had no 
ascertainable meaning, at least in the context of driving explosives into 
Brooklyn, located as it is on Long Island. In rejecting that claim, the Court 
looked to the criminal statute's knowledge requirement, observing that, to con-
vict, the government would not only have to prove there was a practicable safer 
route than that driven, but also that the trucking company either (1) knew of 
that safer alternative and deliberately chose the tunnel or (2) "willfully 
neglected to exercise its duty under the Regulation to inquire into the avail-
ability of such an alternative route. ,,106 
Although the Court was not explicit as to why this knowledge requirement 
should matter, its relevance in answering a vagueness claim is apparent, and it 
says much about the Court's approach to notice and the relationship of that 
approach to the ignorance-of-the-Iaw principle. Certainly, proof that the ac-
cused trucking company knew the specific violative character of its act, i.e., 
that there was a practicable safer route which it deliberately declined to take, 
would undercut an argument that the trucking company was unfairly surprised 
when the regulation was interpreted to forbid driving the more dangerous route. 
This point is straightforward; the act itself, the character of which the accused 
knew, bespeaks its potential criminality. However, the analysis is less straight-
forward if the prosecution seeks to prove a knowing violation of the regulation 
by showing that the defendant willfully neglected a duty imposed by that reg-
ulation. In such a case, it would seem that ignorance of the duty "willfully 
neglected"-a duty imposed by the crirninallaw-would be a defense; that is, 
that ignorance of the law would excuse. 107 
But there is another way to read the Court's reference to a trucking com-
pany's "duty under the Regulation to inquire into the availability of such an 
105 !d. at 339. 
106 Id. at 342. 
107 Justice Jackson made this point in his dissent, an argument which the Court sought to 
counter in a footnote by pointing out that "[t]he officers, agents, and employees of every motor 
carrier concerned with the transportation of explosives and other dangerous articles are required 
[by I.C.C. regulations] to 'become conversant' with this and other regulations applying to such 
transportation." Id. at 342 n.IS. 
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alternative route,,,108 and that is to see that duty as the formal recognition of a 
norm in the industry. Any trucker hauling explosives in interstate commerce 
should know the safest routes and the duty to use those routes, not because the 
criminal law or I.C.C. regulations require it, but because as an empirical and 
normative matter it is part of trucking to know the safest route for hauling 
explosives. Thus, in the same way that a trucking company that knew of a safer 
route and deliberately avoided it must---empirically and normatively-under-
stand the possible criminality of its act, so too for the trucking company who 
did not bother to see if there was a safer route. Both trucking companies, by 
nature of their specialized activity, were on notice that their conduct verged on 
criminal, and neither could complain that the regulation was not crystal clear in 
its prohibition. 
The Court's constructive notice analysis in Boyce says much about the 
strength of the ignorance-of-the-Iaw principle even with regulatory crimes. It 
would have been a more straightforward response to the vagueness argument if 
the Court had read the statute to require the government to prove that an ac-
cused was aware of the regulation and its meaning. 109 Certainly the wording of 
the statute imposing criminal penalties was amenable to such an interpretation, 
providing that "[w]hoever knowingly violates any [pertinent I.C.C.] regulation 
shall be [fined and/or imprisoned]."lIO But as Justice Jackson said in his dis-
sent, "I do not suppose the Court intends to suggest that if petitioner knew 
nothing of the existence of such a regulation its ignorance would constitute a 
defense."lll Rather, the Court read "knowingly violates any such regulation" to 
mean that the prosecutor must prove the accused knew the facts which 
constituted the violation-knew the character of his conduct-not the law 
which prohibits that act. ll2 
That was the way such language in the past had been read, 113 that is, con-
sistent with the principle that ignorance of the law is no excuse. In such spe-
cialized contexts, where knowledge of "the rules" is fairly attributable to those 
regulated, the principle makes sense. The notice provided by the actor's con-
duct is sufficient to give warning of its potential criminality, even for "reg-
ulatory crimes," and as long as the actor is at some level aware of the nature of 
108 Id. at 342. 
109 This, indeed, is the reading which Justice Jackson in his dissent accused the majority of 
adopting. See id. at 345 (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
II0Id. at 339 n.3 (majority opinion). 
III Id. at 345 (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
112 See id. at 342 (majority opinion), 345 (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
113 See id. at 345. 
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that conduct, sufficient notice of the prohibition follows. Where, however, the 
accused could not be said to be aware of the nature of his conduct, at least in-
sofar as it relates to the criminal regulation, fair warning becomes a real issue, 
not just concerning the meaning of a regulatory crime's provisions but ult-
imately concerning its very existence. Such circumstances are surely rare, but 
the Court found them in Lambert v. California, I 14 the one case in which the 
Court held that due process required proof of the defendant's actual notice of 
the criminal prohibition as a predicate to her conviction. 
LAMBERT - THE EMERGENCE OF NOTICE-BASED MENS REA 
In Lambert, the Supreme Court reviewed the conviction of Virginia Lam-
bert for failing to comply with a Los Angeles city ordinance that required any 
person with a prior felony conviction to register with the police if present in 
Los Angeles for a period of more than five days. Ms. Lambert, a seven-year 
resident of Los Angeles, concededly had a prior felony conviction and had not 
registered as required by the ordinance. I IS Her defense was not that the ordi-
nance was too vague to understand but that she was completely unaware of it 
and its requirement that she register-an ignorance-of-Iaw defense which the 
trial court summarily rejected. 116 The Supreme Court reversed the conviction, 
holding that, in the circumstances presented by that case, due process required 
proof that Ms. Lambert had actual knowledge of her duty to register before she 
could be convicted. 117 
Although the basis for and limits of its holding are anything but clear, 118 the 
Court appeared to rely on three circumstances in reaching its conclusion that 
114 355 U.S. 225 (1957). 
lIS /d. at 226. 
116Id. at 227. 
117 Id. at 229-30. 
118 For a sampling of commentator reaction to Lambert, see, e.g., DRESSLER, supra note 42, 
at 184-86 (focusing on the Court's concern that "there was nothing to alert Ms. Lambert or a 
reasonable person to the need to inquire into the law"); GEORGE P. FLETCHER, RETHINKING 
CRIMINAL LAW 424-25 (2000) (analyzing Lambert as a mistake-of-law case in which, because 
the statute punished conduct which did not carry with it notice of criminality, knowledge of the 
law was required); HALL, supra note 3, at 355-56, 404 (suggesting that in certain petty offenses 
which would otherwise be strict liability and for which normal moral or cultural understandings 
do not provide adequate notice, Lambert holds that "knowledge of the law is essential to 
culpability; hence the doctrine of ignorantia juris should not be applied there"); LAP AVE & 
SCOTT, supra note 2, at 208 (focusing on the omission aspect of Lambert, reading the case to 
require knowledge of the legal duty to act only in "omissions involving duties of a highly 
unusual and unforeseeable nature" and not in "all other [omission] cases"); WILLIAMS, supra 
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knowledge of the law was constitutionally required: (1) that Ms. Lambert's 
conduct was "wholly passive-mere failure to register[;],,119 (2) that "cir-
cumstances which might move one to inquire as to the necessity of registration 
were completely lacking[;],,120 and (3) that unlike the typical registration stat-
ute, which is part of a regulatory scheme applicable to some sort of business, 
"th[is] ordinance is but a law enforcement technique designed for the 
convenience oflaw enforcement agencies .... ,,121 The Court used the rhetoric 
of both fair notice and blameworthiness---observing that such circumstances 
combined to deny Ms. Lambert "an opportunity either to avoid the 
consequences of the law or to defend any prosecution brought under it,,122 and, 
quoting Holmes, that "[a] law which punished conduct which would not be 
blameworthy in the average member of the community would be too severe for 
that community to bear,,123 -in holding that knowledge of the law must be 
proved before a conviction consistent with due process could be had. 
The case is usually cited as an example, admittedly rare, of the consti-
tutionallimits of the ignorance-of-the-Iaw principle. 124 So viewed, however, its 
note 83, at 46--47 (citing Lambert as representing "the acceptance by an eminent court of the 
principle that a person cannot justly be punished for an omission in breach of regulation in the 
absence of all fault"); Cass, supra note 83, at 679-80 (viewing Lambert as an example ofthe 
Court's unwillingness to extend strict liability to non-regulatory criminal statutes); Grace, supra 
note 83, at 1405 n.69 (characterizing Lambert as a due process/notice case); Hart, supra note 3, 
at 433-34 (characterizing Lambert as an important, if opaque, reawakening by the Court to the 
central importance of mens rea as a criterion of criminality); Jeffries, supra note 78, at 211 & 
n.60 (recognizing the ambiguity of Lambert's holding but suggesting that its teaching is that 
"[p ]unishment for conduct the average citizen would have had no reason to avoid is unfair and 
constitutionally impermissible"); Mueller, supra note 38, at 1104 (celebrating, prematurely as it 
turns out, Lambert as the Court's signal that "[ a ]bsolute criminal liability is beginning to end in 
America"); Herbert L. Packer, Mens Rea and the Supreme Court, 1962 SUP. Cr. REv. 107, 127-
3 7 (discussing the Court's lack of clarity as well as missed opportunity in addressing important 
constitutional questions concerning mens rea and notice). 
119 Lambert, 355 U.S. at 228. 
120 I d. at 229. 
121Id. 
122Id. 
123 Id. Forecasting its later blurring of blame and notice, or perhaps continuing this 
analytic imprecision, see Packer, supra note 118, at 133, the Court went on to identify the 
severity thus imposed as "the absence of an opportunity either to avoid the consequences of the 
law or to defend any prosecution brought under it." Lambert, 355 U.S. at 229. 
124 See sources cited supra note 118. See, e.g., United States v. Menteer, 350 F.3d 767, 
772 (8th Cir. 2003) (characterizing Lambert as the application of "a narrow exception to the 
general maxim 'ignorance of the law is no excuse,'" grounded in "the defendant's wholly 
passive conduct .... "); United States v. Emerson, 270 F.3d 203, 216 (5th Cir. 2001) (noting 
"that' [t ]he sweep of the Lambert case has been limited by subsequent decisions of the Supreme 
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limits are not apparent. As Justice Frankfurter pointed out in a forceful dissent, 
the Court's heavy reliance on the passive nature of Ms. Lambert's conduct 
would seem to call into question the constitutionality of applying the ignorance-
of-the-Iaw principle to many, ifnot all, crimes which punish failures to comply 
with statutory or regulatory obligations. Although the Court explicitly stated 
that it was not suggesting that ignorance of the law was a constitutionally 
required excuse in registration statutes which "pertain to the regulation of bus i-
ness activities,,,125 its assertion that this statute "is entirely different [because its 
violation] is unaccompanied by any activity whatever .... ,,126 is elusive as a 
constitutional boundary between valid and invalid applications of the 
ignorance-of-the-Iaw principle. 
The problem is not with the Court's conclusion that convicting Ms. Lam-
bert absent proof of her awareness of her statutory duty to register violates due 
process-it surely does. As a conceptual matter, however, the case is less about 
the constitutional limits of punishing someone unaware of the criminal pro-
hibition than it is about the due process limits on punishing a person who has 
no awareness, constructive or actual, of the nature or character of her conduct. 
The unique situation which Lambert addresses is the one at which the 
notice aspects of choosing to engage in conduct of a particular character and of 
choosing to break: the law intersect. As noted above, mens rea, or more 
accurately an actor's awareness of the nature of her conduct which mens rea 
requires, has a notice dimension. Blame, as developed above, is attributable to 
an actor for two reasons: (1) the evil nature of the conduct and (2) her choice, at 
some level, to engage in such conduct. Any requirement that mens rea be 
proven as the vehicle by which blame is attributed to an actor for her conduct 
carries with it a guarantee that the actor has elected to some extent to engage in 
conduct which is antisocial. Those crimes without a mens rea requirement, 
public welfare or regulatory crimes, typically occur in a highly regulated con-
text, and the actor's choice to engage in that field of conduct carries a similar 
guarantee. Either way, the choice to act provides a fundamental baseline of 
notice without which punishment for conduct is unacceptable. So much seems 
required by the free-will basis of criminal punishment, whether primarily 
utilitarian or retributivist in perspective. 127 Similar concerns seem to underlie 
the fundamental requirement of a voluntary act as a prerequisite to criminal 
Court, lest it swallow the general rule that ignorance of the law is no excuse"') (quoting United 
States v. Giles, 640 F.2d 621,628 (5th Cir. 1981)). 
125 Lambert, 355 U.S. at 229. 
126Id. 
127 See discussion supra pp. 12-16,19-21. 
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punishment. '28 There is, however, a conceptual difficulty with characterizing a 
failure to act as chosen conduct unless we have some sense that the "actor" 
understands, constructively or actually, she has a duty to so act. To be sure, at 
the time of such a failure to take a particular course of action, the "actor" 
presumably is engaging in some course of chosen conduct which does not in-
clude the required action. However, it is difficult to say, absent her ap-
preciation of at least the possibility that she should be doing some particular 
thing, that her failure to do it is in any meaningful sense chosen. 
That does not mean that every criminal omission requires proof that the 
"actor" knew of the duty to act before we can characterize her conduct as 
chosen for constitutional purposes. In most such cases we can fairly presume 
such awareness. Where the statutory duty to act is tied to some specialized or 
focused activity in which a person is engaged, as in Boyce, it is not unfair or 
violative of our fundamental notions of choice as a basis for criminal 
punishment to charge her with constructive knowledge ofthat duty and then to 
punish her failure to comply as a chosen act, even if she did not actually know 
of the duty. Her choice to engage in the related, and often closely regulated, 
field of activity is enough to satisfy this basic requirement of chosen conduct. 129 
128 While this core predicate to criminal liability has been the subject of renewed interest 
and thoughtful analysis, see, e.g., MICHAEL S. MOORE, ACT AND CRIME: THE PHILOSOPHY OF 
ACTION AND ITS iMPLICATIONS FOR CRIMINAL LAW (1993); Mueller, supra note 38, at 1104 
(celebrating, prematurely as it turns out, Lambert as the Court's signal that "[a]bsolute criminal 
liability is beginning to end in America"); Ron Shapira, Structural Flaws of the "Willed Bodily 
Movement" Theory of Action, 1 BUFF. CRIM. L. REv. 349 (1998); A.P. Simester, On the So-
Called Requirement for Voluntary Action, 1 BUFF. CRIM. L. REv. 403 (1998). Symposium, On 
the Moral Irrelevance of Bodily Movements, 142 U. PA. L. REv. 1443 (1994). Professor 
Dressler makes the point succinctly: "Criminal punishment, with its attendant pain, stigma and 
formal condemnation ofthe offender, should only be imposed on those who deserve it, i.e., on 
those who act as the result offree choice. In the absence ofa voluntary act, there is no basis for 
social censure." DRESSLER, supra note 42, at 99. 
129 In a similar vein, omission cases in which the duty to act arises from the "actor's" status 
and the criminal liability is based on her failure to prevent a criminal harm to another, as in the 
case ofthe parent who fails to care for her child with the result that the child dies, presents no 
problem of notice even absent a showing ofactual awareness of the duty to act. The offending 
parent will not be permitted to defend the ensuing homicide charge on the basis that she was 
ignorant of her legal duty to care for the child. Such cases, properly understood, are not 
omission cases at all. Rather, in the example above, the parent is being punished for causing the 
prohibited harm because her course of conduct as a parent expectably includes, from both a 
normative and empirical perspective, protecting the child from that harm. When her parenting 
results not in protection but in death, then she is criminally punishable under the homicide 
prohibition for causing it. See Arthur Leavens, A Causation Approach to Criminal Omissions, 
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The same cannot be said for Ms. Lambert or others subject to a statutorily 
imposed duty to act which bears no relationship either to basic societal norms 
of conduct or to a specialized field of activity in which she chose to engage and 
about which she presumably had some particularized knowledge. Absent such 
a connection between "actor" and duty to act, it is impossible to fairly say that 
her failure to comply with the duty was in any sense chosen unless some actual 
awareness of the duty is shown. The duty, then, becomes a conceptual part of 
the conduct, and the actor's awareness of that duty is necessary to a finding that 
the punishable conduct was "chosen.,,\30 
This is the analytic thread which connects the three factors noted by Justice 
Douglas in Lambert and which at the same time limits the due process principle 
which the Court articulates. The ordinance in Lambert was entirely different 
from registration statutes that are part of a regulatory scheme applicable to a 
business because the latter statutes impose duties of registration on persons or 
entities engaged in specialized activities connected to the duty of registration. 131 
Such persons presumably have, or ought to have, some awareness of those 
duties. The Los Angeles ordinance applied to Ms. Lambert had no such con-
nection to her or to anyone to whom it might be applied. Rather, it was a tool 
of police convenience. In the absence of such a connection between the duty 
and the persons subject to it, Ms. Lambert's failure to register was, as the Court 
76 CAL. L. REv. 547, 572-77 (1988). But even if we characterize such cases as omission cases 
in which the failure to act is punishable because ofa violation of the legal duty ofa parent to 
care for her child, presuming an awareness of that duty on the part of a parent does not offend 
basic notions of fair notice. Quite simply, a parent ought, again both normatively and empir-
ically, to appreciate that she is responsible for the basic welfare of her child. 
130 See Graham Hughes, Criminal Omissions, 67 YALE L.J. 590 (1958). Although 
Professor Hughes does not characterize duty as a part of "omissive conduct" for purposes of the 
voluntariness inquiry, he does point out the importance of the actor's awareness of statutorily 
imposed duties to the question of whether punishment can be fairly imposed for their violation. 
Id. at 601-11. See also LAY A VE & Scon, supra note 2, at 208. 
\3J For example, persons engaged in buying, handling or transporting grain for sale in 
foreign commerce must register with the Secretary of Commerce, 7 U.S.C. § 87f-l(a) (1976), 
amended by Pub. L. No.1 03-354, § 293(a)(7) (1994); certain pesticides must be registered with 
the Environmental Protection Agency in order to be sold in the United States, 7 U.S.C. § 136(a) 
(1972), amended by 7 U.S.c. § 136(a) (2004); persons engaged in businesses or trades on which 
a special tax is imposed must register with the Secretary of the Treasury, 26 U.S.C. § 7011 
(1954), amended by 26 U.S.C. § 6013 (1976); facilities engaged in manufacturing, processing, 
packing or holding food for consumption in the United States must register with the Secretary of 
Health and Human Services, 21 U.S.C. § 350(d) (2002); certain investment companies are 
required to register with the Security and Exchange Commission, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-8 (1960), 
amended by 15 U.S.C. § 80a-52 (1970); persons who manufacture or distribute controlled 
substances must register with the Attorney General, 21 U.S.C. § 822 (1970), amended by Pub.L. 
No. 103-200, § 3(b)(1) (1993). 
2007-2008] MENS REA AND REGULATORY CRIME 33 
stated, "wholly passive .... It is unlike the commission of acts, or the failure to 
act under circumstances that should alert the doer to the consequences of his 
deed.,,132 Although the Court did not speak explicitly in terms oflack of "con-
duct notice," that is conceptually what the Court's use of the term "passive" 
implicates. So seen, the Court's holding that Ms. Lambert's knowledge of the 
legal duty must be proven before she may be convicted is important not simply 
as a due process limit on the ignorance-of-the-Iaw principle, but more fully as a 
conceptual means of ensuring that her conduct of omitting to act satisfied the 
fundamental notice requirement that it in some sense be chosen. 
Lambert, then, is not in derogation of the presumption that the criminal law 
is known. It is rather a part of the Supreme Court's constructive notice 
approach to notice problems presented by non-traditional crimes, an approach 
which goes to great length to preserve the presumption that the criminal law is 
known and its correlative principle that ignorance of the law does not excuse. 
Such constructive notice depends, of course, on actors' awareness of the con-
duct in which they are engaging. When the conduct from which notice flows is 
a broad activity, such as trucking in Boyce I33 or retailing kosher meats in 
Hygrade Provision CO.,134 mens rea is not implicated. However, when the 
notice flows from the particular conduct being punished, such as stealing or 
converting government shell casings in Morissette,135 this constructive notice 
depends on the actors' awareness of the nature of their conduct. Such 
awareness, in tum, is assured by the requirement that mens rea be proved as the 
blameworthiness element of the crime. 
This overlap of blame and notice in the mens rea requirement causes no 
tension in traditional crime. Blame is an intrinsic part of these crimes, and 
mens rea is presumed to exist even if the legislative enactment of the crime 
does not provide for it. Constructive notice thus automatically flows, and the 
presumed knowledge of the law and its correlative principle that ignorance of it 
does not excuse causes no rub. However, nontraditional regulatory crimes do 
not necessarily impart blame, and thus mens rea is not presumptively a part of 
those crimes. If a legislature is concerned about providing for notice beyond 
the modest constitutional baseline implicit in Lambert, it can do so in two ways. 
It can provide for actual notice, that is, that knowledge of the law must be 
proven and thus that ignorance of the law is an excuse. Alternatively, a legi-
132 Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225, 228 (1957). 
133 Boyce Motor Lines, Inc. v. United States, 342 U.S. 337 (1952). 
\34 Hygrade Provision Co. v. Sherman, 266 U.S. 497 (1925). 
\3S Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246 (1952). 
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slature can provide for constructive notice, requiring proof that the actor had 
some specified level of awareness concerning the nature of her conduct and its 
circumstances, thus providing assurance that she should have understood that 
she "sail[ ed] close to the shore of questionable conduct.,,136 
Fidelity to the above-outlined paradigm, in which courts presume 
legislatures operate, dictates that such legislative intent to provide for actual no-
tice-i.e., for a mistake-of-law defense-must be manifest. Legislative silence 
or even ambiguity concerning a mistake-of-law defense points away from, not 
toward, such a requirement of actual notice. The question of when a legislature 
can be said to have intended to provide for constructive notice through a notice-
based scienter element is more difficult as a practical matter, although the 
conceptual guidelines are relatively clear. Statutory silence concerning such 
notice-based mens rea is not entitled to the presumption of mens rea accorded 
traditional crimes. By definition there is no blame to support such a presumed 
scienter requirement, and thus more is needed. The question is what. 
In the two decades following Lambert, the Supreme Court fleshed out, if 
somewhat unevenly, this limited but important role of scienter in addressing 
notice concerns with respect to regulatory crimes. The conceptual distinction in 
these opinions between blame and notice as a basis for scienter remained firm, 
even if the Court's rhetoric was occasionally somewhat more loose. 
FREED, INTERNATIONAL MINERALS, PARK AND GYPSUM-FLESHING OUT 
NOTICE-BASED MENS REA 
After thirteen years of silence on the issue of scienter in regulatory crimes, 
in 1971, the Court decided two important cases, United States v. Freed,137 
involving a mistake-of-fact defense, and United States v. International 
Minerals & Chemical COrp.,138 involving an ignorance-of-the-law defense. 
Justice Douglas wrote for the Court in each, and, although his opinions were 
less clear than one might have wished, in each he adhered to the doctrinal 
construct which distinguished between notice and blame as a basis for 
interpreting scienter provisions. 
In Freed, defendant was charged with possessing hand grenades in vio-
lation of the National Firearms Act, which by its terms required that specified, 
mostly military weaponry, including hand grenades, be registered in the 
136 Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 525 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
137 401 U.S. 601 (1971). 
138 402 U.S. 558 (1971). 
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National Firearms Registration and Transfer Record 1 39 and made it unlawful for 
a person "to receive or possess [such a weapon] which is not registered to 
him.,,'40 Although the Act did not explicitly require proof of any intent or 
knowledge, Freed claimed that the government was required not only to prove 
that he knowingly possessed the weapon but also that he knew that it was not 
. d h· 141 reg1stere to 1m. 
In addressing Freed's claim that an implicit knowledge requirement should 
apply to the element of nonregistration, 142 Justice Douglas began by noting the 
difference between statutory silence concerning mens rea in a prohibition with 
common law roots and one "in the expanding regulatory area involving acti-
vities affecting public health, safety and welfare.,,'43 While the former carried 
with it "[t]he presence of a 'vicious will' or mens rea," the latter "was in a 
different category."I44 Within this nontraditional category of crimes, Douglas 
made a further distinction. At one extreme he put cases such as Lambert, in 
which the prohibition punished acts that by their nature or the circumstances in 
which they occurred could not be said to "alert the doer to the consequences of 
his deed.,,'45 In such cases, knowledge of the act's nature, which in Lambert 
translated to knowledge of the duty to act, must be proven in order to assure the 
minimal notice required by due process. Freed did not, in Douglas's view, 
present such a case. Rather it was in that category of regulatory crimes which, 
like adulterating or misbranding drugs or selling narcotics, punish violators 
139 Freed, 401 U.S. at 603 n.3 (citing 26 U.S.C. § 5812 (1968) (current version at 26 
U.S.C. § 5812 (2000))). 
140Id. at 607 (citing 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d) (1968) (invalidated by United States v. Vest, 448 
F. Supp. 2d 1002 (S.D. Ill. 2006))). 
141 Freed, 401 U.S. at 607. 
142 The focus of the case was on the registration element. Although as noted the Act 
contained no term of intent or knowledge, the government accepted that the statute required 
proof that an accused knew that he possessed a firearm before he could be convicted. Id. at 607. 
The case thus proceeded on the unexamined assumption that the government had to prove that 
Freed knowingly possessed the items in question and that he knew they were hand grenades. Id. 
at 612 (Brennan, J., concurring). The precise content of that knowledge requirement was not at 
all clear. Did the Act require proof that an accused knew he possessed a generic firearm, that is 
some kind of weapon, or that he knew he possessed a firearm which had the characteristics 
bringing it under the Act's registration requirement? This issue, which was the crux of Staples 
v. United States, 511 U.S. 600 (1994), discussed infra at pp. 58-66, was not important in Freed 
because the hand grenades which Freed was charged with possessing were plainly recognizable 
as such. 
143Id. at 607-08. 
144 Id. at 607. 
145Id. at 608 (citation omitted). 
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"though consciousness of wrongdoing be totallywanting.,,146 Lack of mens rea 
in such cases was acceptable in Justice Douglas's view because the character of 
the prohibited conduct carried with it adequate notice of potential criminality 
and thus no further mens rea requirement need be inferred. That Justice 
Douglas, and the Court, was premising its mens rea analysis for regulatory 
crimes on notice concerns is plain from his words: 
The present case is in the category neither of Lambert nor Morissette, but is 
closer to Dotterweich. This is a regulatory measure in the interest of the 
public safety, which may well be premised on the theory that one would 
hardly be surprised to learn that possession of hand grenades is not an in-
nocent act. They are highly dangerous offensive weapons, no less dangerous 
than the narcotics involved in United States v. Balint, where a defendant was 
convicted of sale of narcotics against his claim that he did not know the drugs 
were covered by a federal act. 147 
The Court accordingly held that no knowledge should be inferred in the 
absence of an explicit statutory requirement of knowledge applicable to the 
element that the hand grenades were unregistered. Although Justice Douglas 
was characteristically offhand in his analysis, the basis for the holding falls 
right in line with the blame/notice distinction developed above. He reasoned in 
essence that the common law presumption of such mens rea was not applicable 
to this crime and notice concerns neither required nor suggested such a mens 
rea tenn for this statute. 
While Freed was a mistake-of-fact case, thereby at least facially subject to 
the traditional blame paradigm with its presumption of mens rea, 148 
146Id. at 609 (quoting United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277,284 (1943)). 
147Id. at 609 (citation omitted). 
148 The fact, or attendant circumstance, about which Freed was assertedly mistaken was that 
the grenades were not registered under the National Firearms Act. Id. at 605. Freed's ignorance 
of their nonregistration was not ignorance "ofthe law," notwithstanding the fact that it was the 
Act which required their registration in the first place. Id. at 606. His claim was not that he was 
ignorant of the law's command to him-that he not possess an unregistered firearm. Such 
ignorance of the law defining the offense could not excuse, at least absent an explicit provision 
providing for such a defense. Id. Rather, his potential claim was that he did not know that the 
grenades had the characteristics of being unregistered, an intrinsic albeit legal characteristic of 
the grenades which he as a possessor was powerless to alter given that the statute required the 
grenades' registration before he possessed them. Id. Because the mistake which he argued the 
government must disprove was one "off act," Freed did not run headlong into the ignorance of 
the law is no excuse principle. Id. 
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International Minerals l49 involved an ignorance-of-the-Iaw defense. Inter-
national Minerals and Chemical Corporation was charged by information with 
shipping sulfuric and hydrofluosilicic acid in interstate commerce without indi-
cating on the shipping papers that what it was shipping was a "corrosive liquid" 
in violation of an Interstate Commerce Commission regulation requiring such 
labeling.lso Congress, by statute, had authorized the I.C.C. to formulate such 
regulations to safeguard the transportation of dangerous liquids,ISI and pro-
vided that anyone who "knowingly violates any such regulation" was subject to 
imprisonment or a fine. 152 Defendant argued that the language of the statute-
"knowingly violates any such 'regulation"-explicitly provided for an 
ignorance-of-the-Iaw defense. The Supreme Court disagreed, a decision that 
underscored the continuing, post-Lambert viability of the traditional pre-
sumption that the law is known to all. 153 
Defendant's argument had appeal. Although ignorance of the law is 
ordinarily not a defense, Congress can override that presumption and require 
proof of a violator's knowledge of the law as an element of the offense. By 
providing that whoever "knowingly violates any such regulation," the argument 
went, that is exactly what Congress intended to dO. IS4 
149 United States v. Int'l Minerals & Chern. Corp., 402 U.S. 558 (1971). 
ISO Id. at 559 (noting 49 C.F.R. § 173.427 (1960». 
151 Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 834(a) (1964) (repealed 1979». 
IS2Id. (citing § 834(f). 
IS3Id. at 565. 
154 While there are certainly parallels between International Minerals and Boyce, 
International Minerals was not just Boyce redux. First, as the Court in International Minerals 
pointed out, Boyce involved a constitutional void-for-vagueness claim whereas international 
Minerals turned on the interpretation of the statute. Int'l Minerals, 402 U.S. at 560-61. 
Second, on the interpretative question, there was language in International Minerals legislative 
history that arguably supported the defendant's reading of the statute. Several courts of appeals 
had so interpreted the statute, holding that it provided for an ignorance-of-the-Iaw defense, id. at 
565 (Stewart, J., dissenting), and in response to these decisions the I.C.C. had asked Congress to 
amend the statute, either deleting the term "knowingly" altogether or replacing it with the 
phrase, "being aware that the Interstate Commerce Commission has formulated regulations for 
the safe transportation of explosives and other dangerous articles." Id. at 567. The Senate 
passed the latter version of the suggested amendment, but the House did not, expressing concern 
that removing "knowingly" from the statute and instead requiring proof only of a broader 
awareness of the I.C.C. 's regulatory activity would in effect make the statute one of absolute 
liability. Id. at 568. This it was unwilling to do, and "knowingly" was thus restored to the 
statute. The argument that the statute meant what it seemed to say, i.e., that to be guilty one 
must know that one's conduct is in violation of an I.C.C. regulation, thus had apparent though 
indirect support in the statute's then most recent legislative history. 
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Douglas and the five other justices rejected this argument, reading the 
statute's "knowingly" term to require proof only that a violator knew that it was 
shipping dangerous materials. 155 In Douglas's eyes, such knowledge of the 
prohibited act's character-shipping dangerous acids-provided ample notice 
to those engaging in that conduct that they risked criminal regulation. As with 
the possession of narcotics in Balint and of hand grenades in Freed, Douglas 
reasoned that "[t]he probability of regulation is so great that anyone who is 
aware that he is in possession of them or dealing with them must be presumed 
to be aware of the regulation.,,156 
For the majority, then, the ignorance-of-the-Iaw principle was too strong to 
be overcome by statutory language (supported by legislative history) which, 
although susceptible to an interpretation providing for an ignorance-of-the-Iaw 
defense, could also be read to provide for a more conventional term of scienter 
applicable to conduct and its circumstances as opposed to the law itself. This 
latter interpretation assured proof that violators knew the nature of their con-
duct-shipping corrosive chemicals. Such a reading of "knowingly violates 
any such regulation" had no roots in blame but rather addressed Congress's 
apparent notice concerns by assuring conduct notice while at the same time 
providing the relatively strict enforcement necessitated by the potential danger 
to the public that the shipment of hazardous substances involves. 
In a concern that reverberates in the Court's later opinion in Liparota,157 
Justices Stewart, Harlan and Brennan pointed out in the dissent that for 
commercial shippers like International Minerals, such notice would probably 
suffice. However, for the little guy-the one time "casual shipper"-it would 
not. It was to protect these potential violators that, in the dissenters' view, 
Congress meant to create an ignorance-of-the-Iaw defense. Of course, the 
punishment of blameless conduct always carries the possibility of convicting 
the unwarned; however, that is only part of the notice question. Unaddressed 
by the dissenters' concern for the casual shipper is the assessment of the need 
for a broad net, that is, a prohibition without nettlesome excuses difficult to 
overcome by proof. Congress, in dealing with a potential harm, might decide 
1551d. at 560. The legislative history, as Douglas read it, marked not an endorsement ofan 
ignorance-of-the-law defense but rather a rejection of the strict liability which would follow the 
deletion ofthe term "knowingly." ld. at 563. Although he recognized that Congress could, as it 
had in the past, id. at 564, carve out an exception to the ignorance-of-the-law principle, in his 
view the legislative intent to so depart from this basic principle had to be more explicit before 
he was prepared to recognize such a defense. ld. 
1561d. at 565. 
157 471 U.S. 419 (1985), discussed infra pp. 47-50. 
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that protection of the public welfare requires it to impose through a regulatory 
crime a duty of absolute liability, i.e., a duty that tolerates no mistakes or 
ignorance, even the reasonable ones that a negligence standard would recognize 
as an excuse. This would be true strict liability, something which neither Freed 
nor International Minerals approached. 158 
Such a categorical approach to blameless criminality would have to find its 
constructive notice in the field of activity which was the subject of regulation 
and in which the actor was engaged, notice that is more problematic. Without 
proof that the accused knew, or even should have known, he was engaged in 
the prohibited conduct, there must be some assurance that the activity in which 
the accused engaged was sufficiently discrete and connected to the ultimate 
potential for harm that those involved can fairly be said to appreciate the 
possibility of criminal regulation. As noted, the Court in Balint l59 and 
158 Freed's holding that the National Fireanns Act provided for strict liability on the 
element of registration was expressly premised on the actor's assumed knowledge that he 
possessed a dangerous piece of military weaponry (there, hand grenades), an understanding that 
seems fairly attributable to persons covered by the Act, whether or not they actually understood 
the nature ofthe particular forbidden weapon possessed. United States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601, 
606 (1971). And the statute at issue in International Minerals required proof that the shipper 
knew the nature of that which it was shipping, i.e., potentially hazardous chemicals. Int'l 
Minerals, 402 U.S. at 565. In Staples, the case in which the Court returned to the National 
Firearms Act thirty-three years after Freed to consider whether Congress intended strict liability 
concerning the nature of the weapon possessed, Justice Thomas made this point. Staples v. 
United States, 511 U.S. 600,607 n.3 (1994) (discussed infra pp. 50-55). Certainly, neither 
statute approaches the point at which a plausible claim could be made that strict liability violates 
due process. See Alan C. Michaels, Constitutional Innocence, 112 HARV. L. REv. 828, 835-36 
(1999). 
Professor Michaels argues that strict liability is constitutional so long as the state 
constitutionally can punish the "non-strict-liability" elements of a crime. Id. at 835. Bigamy is 
Michaels's example. Surely after Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), a legislature could 
not constitutionally forbid simply getting married. More is required before the state can punish 
that conduct. Bigamy, of course, adds the element of being married to another. Michaels asserts 
that it would violate due process to impose strict liability for bigamy's element of "married to 
another"-that is, to punish for bigamy even ifthe actor exercised "perfect care," as much care 
as is possible, with respect to that element-because without that element, the legislature would 
be punishing no more than the act of getting married. Michaels, supra, at 836. There could be 
no valid claim of unconstitutional punishment in spite of "perfect care," i.e., of constitutional 
innocence, for either Donald Freed or International Minerals & Chemical Corporation. The 
legislature could constitutionally choose to punish, in the case of Freed, possession of 
designated military weaponry, and, in the case of International Minerals, transportation of 
hazardous chemicals in interstate commerce. 
159 United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250 (1922). 
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Dotterweich 160 had apparently approved of such "field-of-activity" notice (as 
opposed to the "conduct notice" provided by notice-based scienter), but it was 
not clear after Lambert that the Court was prepared to continue to endorse 
such strict liability. In both Freed and International Minerals the Court had 
begun its analysis by observing that those respective cases did not involve true 
strict liability. United States v. Park,161 on the other hand, did. 
In Park, the Court revisited its controversial holding in Dotterweich,162 
decided thirty-two years earlier. In Dotterweich, the Court held that the pres-
ident of a corporate jobber that inadvertently mislabeled drugs purchased from 
the manufacturer and offered them for resale under its own label could be 
convicted for this mislabeling under the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act163 
simply upon proof that he, the president, had a "responsible share in the 
furtherance of the transaction which the statute outlaws."I64 The Dotterweich 
holding was based on the Court's view of the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic 
Act as: 
[A] now familiar type of legislation whereby penalties serve as effective 
means of regulation. Such legislation dispenses with the conventional re-
quirement for criminal conduct-awareness of some wrongdoing. In the 
interest ofthe larger good it puts the burden of acting at hazard upon a person 
otherwise innocent but standing in responsible relation to a public danger. 165 
So read, the Act imposes strict liability, relying on a violator's participation 
in the regulated activity and that activity's relation to the prohibited harm to 
provide notice that the violator is behaving criminally. As noted above, the 
Dotterweich court recognized that this reading of the statute would "doubtless" 
create hardship in cases in which "consciousness of wrongdoing be totally 
wanting," but it deferred to what it saw as the congressional "balancing of 
relative hardships" between the potential for punishment of unknowing vio-
160 United States v. Dotterwich, 320 U.S. 277 (1943). 
161 421 U.S. 658 (1975). 
162 See, e.g., Hart, supra note 3, at 431-33 & nn.70, 73 (attacking Dotterweich as among 
those early, slip-shod mens rea opinions that do not "deserv[e] intellectual respect"). But see 
Bilionis, supra note 46, at 1291-94 (defending Frankfurter's opinion in Dotterwiech as 
"reflect[ing] a strongly process-oriented understanding ofthe Constitution's relationship with 
the criminal law"). 
163 21 U.S.C. § 331(k)(1970)(current version at Pub. L. No. 109-59, title VII, § 7204,119 
Stat. 1914 (2005)). 
164 Dotterweich, 320 U.S. at 284. 
165Id. at 280-81 (citing United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250 (1922)). 
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lators and the need to protect "the innocent public" from mislabeled drug 
products. 166 
Park was the chief executive officer of a nationwide retail food chain that 
had a warehouse in which federal inspectors found rodent droppings. Park was 
charged under the same Food and Drug Act with the interstate shipping offood 
that had been exposed to rodent contamination and thus "may have been 
rendered injurious to health.,,167 Although Park's conviction was based solely 
on his position as the CEO-there being no evidence that he was aware of the 
rodent contamination-the Court upheld his conviction. In his opinion for the 
Court, Chief Justice Burger reiterated the perceived public necessities which 
gave rise to this regulatory prohibition with its provisions which purtished even 
those without consciousness of wrongdoing. 168 
The Court again held that the Act imposed vicarious liability on corporate 
employees or officers who, by virtue of their relationship to the subordinate 
who actually committed the prohibited act or omission, were also deemed 
responsible for it. 169 The Act, the Court held, imposed on such responsible 
corporate officials "not only a positive duty to seek out and remedy violations 
when they occur but also, and primarily, a duty to implement measures that will 
insure that violations will not occur. ,,170 
The Act thus imposed on corporate officials a positive duty of perfect care 
with respect to potentially harmful conditions wherever they may be, punishing 
failures to find and to remedy such conditions without any showing that these 
officials knew, or even should have known, that they existed. Three members 
of the Court, Justices Stewart, Marshall and Powell, dissented to this seemingly 
stark reading, arguing that the Act required proof that an accused such as Park 
was at least negligent with respect to the offending conditions. 171 However, 
there was no requirement on the face of the statute that an offender be proven 
negligent in causing the contamination, and given the Act's regulatory nature, 
there was no basis to presume any level of scienter in the face of this statutory 
silence. A requirement that negligence, or any level of awareness concerning 
the nature of the forbidden conduct, be proven would have had to be inferred 
166Id. at 284-85. 
167 21 U.S.C. § 342(a)(4) (1968) (current version at Pub. L. No. 109-59, title VII, § 
n02(a), 119 Stat. 1911 (2005». See United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658, 661 n.l (1975). 
168 Park, 421 U.S. at 668. 
169Id. at 670-71. 
170Id. at 672. 
171Id. at 658 (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
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out of a concern for notice. The presumption, however, runs against such an 
inferred constructive notice requirement, a presumption overcome only by the 
express or plainly inferable intent of Congress to correct the need/fairness 
balance. 
Although the Chief Justice conceded that the Act's absolute requirements 
of "vigilance and foresight ... are beyond question demanding, and perhaps 
onerous,,,I72 the Court found no evidence of a congressional desire to require a 
notice-based element of negligence. The Act as written was not in the Court's 
eyes overly unfair. Mr. Park was not in a position similar to Ms. Lambert, 
subject to criminal liability for failing to fulfill a statutory obligation-there, to 
register as a felon with the police-the existence of which she had no reason to 
suspect. Rather, as the Chief Justice pointed out, Park was a corporate exec-
utive who voluntarily assumed a position of responsibility and authority in an 
industry at the heart oflegitimate public concern for its health and well-being. 
The need for the highest vigilance on the part of corporate officers like Park 
was great, and due to his voluntary participation in this field of endeavor, he 
stood fairly warned of the risks. The need/fairness balance suggested no reason 
to require the further notice to him which proof of negligence would have 
provided. Congress apparently chose not to provide for it, and the Court was 
willing to so read the statute, harsh though it seemed. 
Three years later in United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 173 the 
Court provided the counter balance, holding that the Sherman Act, at least in its 
criminal application, was intended by Congress to include a mens rea ele-
ment-knowledge of the prohibited conduct's likely anticompetitive effect. 174 
In reaching this result, the Court openly employed notice analysis (although 
occasionally cloaked in the rhetoric of blame), balancing fairness concerns 
against societal needs in antitrust enforcement. 
In Gypsum, six major corporate producers of gypsum board, which together 
accounted for the vast majority of the national sales ofthis important building 
material, along with several executives of these companies were indicted and 
convicted of combining and conspiring to "restrain[ ] ... interstate trade and 
commerce in the manufacture and sale of gypsum board," in violation of 
section One of the Sherman Act. 175 Specifically, indictments charged that the 
172 Id. 
173 438 U.S. 422 (1978). 
174 I d. at 444. 
175 See id. at 427. 
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defendants and their unindicted co-conspirators 176 engaged in a conspiracy to 
fix prices as well as the tenns and conditions of sales and the methods of 
packaging and handling gypsum board. 177 The core of the case was the charge 
that the conspirators contacted one another to fix and then specifically to verify 
prices and tenns and conditions of sales. 178 Although they disputed the extent 
of these contacts, particularly their price verification efforts, the defendants 
maintained that the price verifications which did occur were legal exchanges of 
price infonnation the purpose of which was not to restrain trade but to enable 
them (l) to "meet the competition" as pennitted under the Robinson-Patman 
Actl79 and (2) to prevent customer fraud. 180 The district court's instructions to 
the jury purportedly recognized the Robinson-Patman "meet-the-competition" 
defense, but went on to charge that: 
The law presumes that a person intends the necessary and natural con-
sequences of his acts. Therefore, if the effect of the exchanges of pricing 
information was to raise, fix, maintain, and stabilize prices, then the parties to 
them are presumed, as a matter oflaw, to have intended that result. ISI 
Such a legal presumption of intent, of course, amounts to strict liability. 
In an opinion again by Chief Justice Burger, the Court reversed. The Court 
began with what it characterized as the criminal law's "generally inhospitable 
attitude to non-mens rea offenses,,,182 recognizing the common law tradition as 
the basis for this presumption of mens rea. However, once the Chief Justice 
turned specifically to the Shennan Act, his mens rea analysis was almost 
exclusively notice-based, even if his rhetoric was not. 
At the core of the Chief Justice's analysis was his recognition that the 
Shennan Act, even as judicially narrowed,183 punished conduct for the most 
176 The two remaining major manufacturers of gypsum board, along with the Gypsum 
Association were named as unindicted co-conspirators. Id. at 427 n.2. 
177 Id. at 427. 
178 Id. at 428-29. 
179Id. at 429 n.4 (citing 15 U.S.C. § l3(b) (1976) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § l3(b) 
(2000))). 
180Id. at 429. 
181 Id. at 430. 
182 I d. at 438. The apparent reason for this analytic jump was the Court's conflation of 
regulatory crime and strict liability. See id. at 442 n.18. The Court may also have been seeking 
the benefit of the traditional presumption of scienter, but its careful notice-based reasoning in 
support of its holding belies such an instrumental approach. 
183 Section One of the Sherman Act provides in relevant part: 
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part by the economic results which it engendered. As the Chief Justice pointed 
out, on the facts of Gypsum the exchange of price data among competitors is 
not invariably anticompetitive in effect. Such conduct is only a violation of the 
Act when, as there occurred, it has that result. 184 Imposing criminal sanctions 
on the basis of such hindsight, while hardly unprecedented in criminal law, 185 
creates difficulties on both the need and fairness sides of the notice balance. If 
conduct that is potentially justifiable because it might foster increased 
competition turns out to be criminal because of its actual anticompetitive im-
pact, fair warning concerns seem obvious. True, they may be no greater than 
those applicable to executives like John Park, whom the Food and Drug Act 
punish without even a showing of negligence if a warehouse in their respective 
corporate empires turns up infested with mice. However, it would seem to be a 
fair legislative judgment that the need for sanitation in the food industry may 
require the extra vigilance thought to flow from the duty of perfect care 
imposed by strict liability. Whether the imposition of such an unforgiving 
standard of care actually results in more sanitary warehouses may be open to 
question, but there seems to be no compelling social benefit that might be 
chilled or foregone due to such heavy-handed deterrence. 
Every contract, combination in the fonn of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in 
restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is 
declared to be illegal. Every person who shall make any contract or engage in any 
combination or conspiracy hereby declared to be illegal shall be deemed guilty of a 
felony .... 
15 U.S.C. § 1 (1955) (current version at Pub. L. No. 108-237, title II, § 215(a), 118 Stat. 668 
(2004». Since by design all contracts and commercial combinations restrain trade through their 
mutually agreed limitations in the participants' future commercial behavior, the Act was 
judicially narrowed to forbid "only such contracts and combinations ... [which] by reason of 
intent or the inherent nature of the contemplated acts, prejudice the public interests by unduly 
restraining competition or unduly obstructing the course of trade." Nash v. United States, 229 
U.S. 373, 376 (1913). 
184 Gypsum, 438 U.S. at 440--41 & n.16. 
185 As Justice Holmes pointed out in Nash v. United States, holding that the Shennan Act's 
"rule of reason" was not unconstitutionally vague as a standard of criminality: 
[T]he law is full of instances where a man's fate depends on his estimating rightly, 
that is, as the jury subsequently estimates it, some matter of degree. Ifhis judgment is 
wrong, not only may he incur a fine or a short imprisonment, as here; he may incur 
the penalty of death. . .. The very meaning of the fiction of implied malice in 
[criminal homicide] cases at common law was, that a man might have to answer with 
his life for consequences which he neither intended nor foresaw. The criterion in 
such cases is to examine whether common social duty would, under the 
circumstances, have suggested a more circumspect conduct. 
Nash, 229 U.S. at 237 (citations and internal quotations omitted). 
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In contrast, the line of criminality under the Sherman Act marks the dif-
ference between meeting the competition in a highly competitive market-a 
congressionally endorsed activity, and fixing prices to reduce competition-a 
crime. Imposing absolute criminal liability for economic conduct falling in 
such a "gray zone" of potential benefit or harm may be socially harmful in that 
it may chill "salutary and pro-competitive conduct lying close to the borderline 
of impermissible conduct.,,186 The notice balance thus overcame the pre-
sumption that Congress did not intend to create a specific notice defense, and 
the Court held that the Sherman Act, in its criminal application, required proof 
of criminal intent. 187 
In deciding what level of intent it ought to infer, the Court continued with 
its application of the fairness/needs balance in the context of business decision-
making to which the antitrust laws apply. The Court dismissed negligence and 
recklessness as inappropriate standards of criminality in this gray area of pos-
sible anti competitive effect. 188 As between "knowledge" and "purpose," the 
Court reasoned that requiring proof of the "knowledge oflikely effects" would 
appropriately balance the fairness and deterrence concerns in an activity 
involving "conscious behavior normally undertaken after a full consideration of 
the desired results and a weighing of the costs, benefits, and risks,,189 whereas 
requiring proof of the "conscious desire to bring [those likely effects] to 
fruition. . . particularly in such a context, [would be] both unnecessarily 
cumulative and unduly burdensome.,,19o The Court thus concluded that 
186 Gypsum, 438 U.S. at 441-43 & n.17 (expressly distinguishing its decision in Park on 
this social-impact basis). See also Dan M. Kahan, Is Ignorance ofF act an Excuse Only for the 
Virtuous?, 96 MICH. L. REv. 2123, 2126 (1998) (noting that strict liability can "overdeter" and 
arguing that strict liability is inappropriate when applied to a factual element that marks "the 
boundary line between morally desirable and morally undesirable behavior"). Because of these 
concerns, as the Court noted, both the Attorney General's National Committee to Study 
Antitrust Laws and the Antitrust Division of the Justice Department had concluded that criminal 
prosecution should be reserved for cases in which it is clear, both in law and in fact, that the 
conduct was a flagrant violation of the Act. Gypsum, 438 U.S. at 439-40. The Court noted that 
the Antitrust Division of the Justice Department adopted guidelines emphasizing that only 
willful violators of the Act should be prosecuted, thus seeming to reserve liability only for those 
who had actual notice of their unlawfulness. Id. 
187 Id. at 443-44. 
188 Although the Court here gave no reason, this rejection of a level of scienter less than 
knowledge or purpose seems appropriate given that the statute is marking the line between crim-
inal business conduct and justifiable business conduct that Congress has encouraged through 
passage of the Robinson-Patman Act. See Kahan, supra note 186, at 2126. 
189 Gypsum, 438 U.S. at 445-46. 
190Id. at 446. 
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"[ w ]here carefully planned and calculated conduct is being scrutinized in the 
context of a criminal prosecution, the perpetrator's knowledge of the antici-
pated consequences is a sufficient predicate for a finding of criminal intent.,,191 
After Lambert, Freed, International Minerals, Park and Gypsum, the Court 
had laid out the four comers of notice-based scienter, even if it had not filled in 
all the blanks or even explicitly recognized it as a concept distinct from 
traditional, blame-based mens rea. Lambert recognized the importance of 
scienter as an instrument of notice,192 but Freed and International Minerals 
demonstrated the Court's continuing commitment to the presumption that fair 
notice flows from the nature of the conduct regulated, a presumption that re-
mains unrebutted as long as it seems apparent that potential violators would 
likely be aware of the nature of their offending conduct. 193 Park extended this 
reasoning to the field of activity regulated as an instrument of notice, declining 
to infer notice-based mens rea even if the actor was almost certainly unaware of 
the offending conduct in question. l94 Gypsum, however, staked out the limits 
of this fair-notice presumption, inferring congressional intent to provide for 
notice-based mens rea where both the activity regulated and the conduct in 
question left a serious question concerning the notice provided to potential 
violators. 195 However, no sooner had this construct emerged than it began to 
fall apart as the Court disregarded its own teachings in a series of cases that 
began with Liparota v. United States .196 
LIPAROTA-CONFLATION OF BLAME AND NOTICE 
In Liparota, the Supreme Court reviewed the conviction of a Chicago 
restauranteur who had been convicted of the unauthorized acquisition and pos-
session of federal food stamps in violation of section 2024(b)( 1) of the Federal 
Food Stamp Act. Mr. Liparota operated a sandwich shop which was not auth-
orized to accept food stamps, and he was not individually eligible under the 
statute to use or acquire them. Nevertheless, on three occasions he purchased a 
quantity of food stamps from an undercover federal agent, each time paying a 
heavily discounted price for the stamps. 197 
191/d. 
192 355 U.S. 225 (1957). 
193 401 U.S. 601 (1971); 402 U.S. 558 (1971). 
194 421 U.S. 658 (1975). 
195 438 U.S. 422 (1978). 
196 471 U.S. 419 (1985). 
197Id. at 421. 
2007-2008] MENS REA AND REGULATORY CRIME 47 
Section 2024(b)(I) provides, in relevant part, "whoever knowingly ... 
acquires ... or possesses coupons . . . in any manner not authorized by this 
chapter or the regulations issued pursuant to this chapter shall ... be guilty of a 
felony .... ,,198 Looking to the statutory term "knowingly," Mr. Liparota 
sought to defend by asserting he did not know his acquisition and possession of 
the stamps was unauthorized, an ignorance-of-the-Iaw defense seemingly 
foreclosed by the Court's decisions in Boyce and International Minerals. 199 In 
an unacknowledged departure from this line of precedent, the Supreme Court 
chose to frame the issue differently and reversed. Justice Brennan, writing for a 
six-justice majority, held section 2024(b)(I) required proof that an accused 
"knew that his acquisition or possession of food stamps was in a manner 
unauthorized by statute or regulations.,,2oo This result, as Justice Brennan 
explained, was "particularly appropriate where, as here, to interpret the statute 
otherwise would be to criminalize a broad range of apparently innocent con-
dUCt.,,201 If by "innocent conduct" Justice Brennan meant not blameworthy, 
that would seem to be an analytic non-sequitor because the statute in question 
was plainly part of a regulatory scheme intended to ensure proper use of food 
stamps, themselves a creature of statute. There is no suggestion that the Court 
considered the criminal provisions of the Food Stamp Act to outlaw conduct 
that, as a matter of societal consensus, was harmful or wrongful. This is a 
classic regulatory crime, and the Court's opinion made it clear that the concern 
was not blame but notice. 
The Court seemed concerned that under the Act a large class of relatively 
unsophisticated persons-food stamp users-faced potential felony liability 
based on violations of technical, and sometimes administratively defined, cate-
gories of authorized acquisition, possession and use of something which was a 
vital part of their lives-food stamps. Liparota thus differed from both Boyce 
and International Minerals, each of which dealt with criminalizing violations 
of a regulatory scheme applicable to industries accustomed to regulation. 
Notice in cases like Boyce and International Minerals was augmented by the 
field of activity in which likely violators had chosen to engage. While the 
dissenters in International Minerals expressed concern that the occasional 
"casual shipper" might stumble into the web of regulation-and a criminal 
198 Liparota, 471 U.S. at 420 n.l (quoting 7 U.S.C. § 2024(b)(1) (1981) (current version at 
7 U.S.C. § 2024(b)(1) (2000))). 
199 Liparota, 471 U.S. at 422. But cf Boyce Motor Lines, Inc. v. United States, 342 U.S. 
337 (1952); Int'l Minerals & Chern. Corp. v. United States, 402 U.S. 558 (1971). 
200 Liparota, 417 U.S. at 433. 
201 Id. at 426. 
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conviction-in Liparota there seemed to be a more significant danger of such 
unwitting criminality. The Court responded to this notice concern by reading 
the statute to impose the buffer of an ignorance-of-the-Iaw defense between 
such "innocents" and their conviction.202 
As a matter of social policy, the Court may have reached the right result in 
Liparota;203 however, it did so not by careful notice balancing, but instead by 
disregarding the blame-notice distinction altogether. Justice Brennan began his 
scienter analysis by going straight to Morissette, citing its recognition of the 
background assumption that mens rea is a part of every crime.204 Morissette, of 
course, owes its importance to its refusal to extend to federal crimes with 
common law roots the "strict liability" which the Court earlier in the century 
began to apply in regulatory crimes such as the narcotics laws in Balinr05 and 
the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act in Dotterweich.206 However, unlike 
Morissette, Liparota dealt not with a federal codification of a common law 
offense or its modem analog but with the criminal enforcement provisions of a 
regulatory scheme which governed the operation of the federal food stamp 
program, which is, as noted, entirely a creature of the Food Stamp Act and its 
202Id. at 425-27. The majority refused to characterize this holding as one which permitted 
an ignorance-of-the-Iaw defense. Id. at 425 n.9. Justice Brennan vigorously insisted that on the 
contrary this approach represented no more than the application of the traditional mens rea 
doctrine which presumes the existence of some scienter element and thus permits a mistake 
defense. Id. at 425. But, as Justice White pointed out in dissent, the question of what is and is 
not authorized regarding food stamps is set forth in the statutes and regulations of which section 
2024 is a part, i.e., in the law defining the offense. Id. at 438-39 (White, J., dissenting). That 
question of authorization, in other words, is answered by the very criminal prohibition which 
Mr. Liparota was accused of violating, and his mistake or ignorance in that regard is one oflaw 
which is not a defense unless the legislature explicitly so provides. 
Justice Brennan, of course, was no stranger to this ignorance-of-the-Iaw principle. He also 
appreciated that the reach of "knowingly" in the statute was ambiguous, id. at 424-25 (majority 
opinion), thus undercutting any argument that Congress plainly meant to provide for an 
ignorance-of-the-Iaw defense. Justice Brennan sought to avoid these doctrinal obstacles by 
characterizing the mistake concerning authorized use of the stamps as implicating issues of 
culpability and blame. Id. at 425 n.9. With the element of unauthorized use so characterized, 
Brennan held the doctrinal presumption in favor of scienter required the ambiguity concerning 
the reach of "knowingly" be resolved in favor of requiring proof the defendant knew his 
possession of the stamps was unauthorized. Id. at 425. 
203 Justice White, in his dissent, argued with some force that if one assumes responsible 
prosecution, the trap for the unwary, which concerned the Court, was not nearly as large or 
troubling as Justice Brennan suggested. Id. at 437 & n.3 (White, J., dissenting). 
204 Id. at 425-26 (majority opinion). 
205 258 U.S. 250 (1922). 
206 320 U.S. 277 (1943). 
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ensuing regulations.207 And unlike Morissette, the Court's explicit concern in 
Liparota was not that proof of mens rea was a necessary part of proving the 
criminal act. Rather, although couched in the rhetoric of blame, Justice 
Brennan's concern was one of notice to unwary putative violators of the Food 
Stamp Act. 
The Court's insistent resort to the inapt blameworthiness analysis seems 
attributable to its dissatisfaction with the legislative response to the notice 
concern. While the Food Stamp Act expressly provided that to be criminal the 
regulatory violation had to be "knowing," as the Court itself had pointed out in 
Boyce and again in International Minerals, such a knowledge provision had 
always been understood to require proof that an accused violator was aware of 
the nature of his or her conduct, but not to require proofthat the accused knew 
such conduct was criminally prohibited.208 Ignorance of the law is no excuse. 
Lest this analysis appear wooden and insensitive to the difference between 
food-stamp users on the one hand and interstate shippers on the other, the 
knowledge that had to be proved in Mr. Liparota's case was that he possessed 
food stamps and knew what they were, that is, coupons issued by the Federal 
Department of Agriculture to be used by low-income persons to purchase food, 
generally at retail food stores.209 Although Justice Brennan, foretelling an 
approach in subsequent opinions of the Court, identified possible hypothetical 
applications of the statute to "innocents," proof of such particular conduct 
awareness and the constructive notice of the conduct's criminality thus im-
parted would seem to go far in addressing concerns that the statute created a 
trap for the unwary. Moreover, Justice Brennan completely ignored the needs 
side of the notice balance, a potentially weighty congressional concern when 
dealing with the prevention of abuses in a vast and expensive program for 
providing important assistance to the nation's poor. 
207 While in part the food stamp regulations forbade the fraudulent use ofthese coupons, 
and thus could be said to impart a traditional criminal law focus to the Act, as noted, it was not 
this aspect of the regulatory prohibitions which concerned the Court. Rather, the Court was 
concerned with what it characterized "a broad range of apparently innocent conduct" forbidden 
by the regulations, such as the use of food coupons to purchase food items at prices above 
prevailing prices from participating retailers. Liparota, 471 U.S. at 426. Perhaps even more so 
than the antitrust laws at issue in Gypsum, the Food Stamp Act was a pure regulatory criminal 
provision without, at least in the applications of concern to the Court, any blameworthiness 
content. 
208 See United States v. Int'I Minerals & Chern. Corp., 402 U.S. 558,560--63 (1971); 
Boyce Motor Lines, Inc. v. United States, 342 U.S. 337, 342 n.15, 345 (1952). 
209 Liparota, 471 U.S. at 422 n.2. 
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In the end, it was the result that mattered. Apparently dissatisfied with the 
presumption of restraint which conventionally attends notice analysis, requiring 
statutory ambiguity to be resolved by limiting the reach of "knowingly" to the 
nature of the offending conduct, Justice Brennan and his colleagues short-
circuited the interpretive process. The result was a curious analytic hybrid in 
which under the rubric of blameworthiness-and its inapt mens rea pre-
sumption-they read this regulatory statute to require proof of actual notice of 
its command, providing for an ignorance-of-the-law defense. 
LIPAROTA'S LEGACy-RA1ZLAF AND STAPLES 
Rather than being an aberrant departure from principled analysis in 
response to a pocket of apparent unfairness in the federal criminal code, 
Liparota has become the fulcrum of the Court's emerging scienter analysis. 
The distinction between traditional mens rea (with its presumption grounded in 
the blameworthiness characteristic of common law crime) and the concept of 
notice-based scienter (in which the presumption runs the other way) seems lost 
in the Court's interpretive work. In its place is an undifferentiated presumption 
of scienter flowing from a broad concern that without a requirement that 
conduct be animated by a ''wrongful purpose"-that is, a purpose imbued 
somehow with blame-"a broad range of apparently innocent conduct" would 
be made crimina1.2lO This confluence of blameworthiness and notice concerns 
prompted the Court in Staples v. United Statei 11 to require proof that the 
accused know the nature of his conduct in a regulatory offense where no such 
scienter requirement was suggested by the text or legislative history of the 
statute212 and in United States v. RatzlaJ213 to require proof that the accused 
know the illegality of his conduct where no such departure from the ignorance-
of-the-law principle was suggested by the statute or its history. 
IGNORANCE OF LAW: RA 1ZLAF 
RatzlaJinvolved violations of the Federal Money Laundering Control Act, 
a statute enacted in part to facilitate effective enforcement of the Currency and 
Foreign Transactions Reporting Act, more familiarly known as the Bank Se-
210 Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 610 (1994) (quoting Lparota, 471 U.S. at 426). 
211 !d. 
212 !d. at 619-20; see, e.g., Posters 'N' Things, Ltd. v. United States, 511 U.S. 513,523 
(1994); United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64,70 (1994). 
213 510 U.S. 135 (1994). 
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crecy Act. 214 The Bank Secrecy Act was designed to combat the use of banking 
and financial institutions by criminals such as drug dealers, and it required 
reports to the Treasury Department of a variety of financial transactions 
including, as here relevant, reports by domestic financial institutions of any 
cash deposit totaling $10,000 or more.215 Because it turned out to be relatively 
simple to avoid this requirement by breaking such deposits into lesser amounts, 
Congress subsequently passed the so-called antistructuring provision of the 
Money Laundering Control Act,216 which provided: 
No person shall, for the purpose of evading the reporting requirements of [the 
above noted provision of the Bank Secrecy Act] with respect to such 
transactions ... (3) structure or assist in structuring, or attempt to structure or 
assist in structuring, any transaction with one or more domestic financial 
institutions.217 
This antistructuring provision thus became part of the web of federal 
regulations concerning currency transactions. Each such regulatory require-
ment was criminally enforced under a single provision, section 5322(a) of title 
31, which authorized fines of up to $250,000 and imprisonment for up to five 
years for any person "willfully violating" that statute or its regulations.2I8 
Waldemar Ratzlafwas charged with violations of the anti structuring pro-
vision when he paid off a $100,000 casino-gambling debt with cashier checks 
in amounts of less than $10,000.219 Ratzlaf defended by arguing that his acts 
were not "willful" under section 5322 because, while he knew of and sought to 
avoid the reporting requirement, he did not know that it was unlawful so to 
structure his currency transactions.22o In support of this argument, he cited 
Cheek v. United States,221 a criminal tax case in which the Court had relied on 
longstanding but narrow precedent to hold that "willfully," as used in the 
214 I d. at 138 (citing 31 U.S.C. §§ 5311-5325 (1993) (current version at 31 U.S.C. §§ 
5311-5325 (2000»). 
215 Ratzlaf, 510 U.S. at 138-39 n.3. 
216 Id. at 138 (citing 31 U.S.C. § 5324 (1993) (current version at Pub. L. No. 108-458, title 
VI, § 6203(g), 118 Stat. 3747 (2004»). 
217 31 U.S.C. § 5324 (1993) (current version at Pub. L. No.1 08-458, title VI, § 6203(g), 
118 Stat. 3747 (2004». 
218 31 U.S.C. § 5322 (l993)(cited in Ratzlaf, 510 U.S. at 140). Ratzlaf, 510 U.S. at 140 
(citing 31 U.S.C. § 5322 (1993) (current version at Pub. L. No. 107-56, title III, §§ 353(b), 
363(b), 115 Stat. 323, 332 (2001»). 
219 Ratzlaf, 510 U.S. at 137. 
220 I d. at 138. 
221 498 U.S. 192 (1991). 
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criminal provisions of the Internal Revenue Code, provides for an ignorance-of-
the-law defense. The lower courts in RatzlaJrejected this extension of Cheek 
beyond the tax code, holding that Congress did not intend for the Bank Secrecy 
Act to provide for a similar defense.222 
The Supreme Court reversed and held that to act "willfully" under section 
5322, a person must know that his conduct is illegal.223 The Court attempted to 
fit its analysis into the conventional doctrinal framework, implicitly recognizing 
that a departure from the principle that ignorance of the law is no excuse 
requires clear and explicit legislative direction. The Court saw the term "will-
fully" in section 5322 as providing that mandate. However, an examination of 
that term, both as conventionally understood and as used in section 5322, does 
not support the Court's conclusion. 
Starting with the term itself, the word "willfully" traditionally has been 
construed as meaning that an actor must know the nature of his or her conduct. 
While "willfully" can mean more, including, as the Court held in Cheek, im-
posing a specific intent to act unlawfully/24 such expansion of the conventional 
interpretation of the term must be clear from either its use in the statute or the 
legislative history of the statute in question.225 
The Court purported to find support for its construction in the statutory 
framework, reasoning that to read "willfully" conventionally-that is, requiring 
only that Ratzlaf knew he was acting to circumvent the Bank Secrecy Act's 
reporting requirements but not that he knew that it was illegal-would render 
"willfully" surplusage. That was so according to the Court because the anti-
structuring provision itself required proof that Ratzlaf and others like him act 
"for the purpose of evading the reporting requirements of [the Bank Secrecy 
Act],,,226 proof which necessarily entailed establishing Ratzlafs knowledge of 
the financial institution's reporting requirement.227 This argument, however, 
222 Ratz/af, 510 U.S. at 138. 
223/d. 
224/d. at 141. See Cheek, 498 U.S. at201 (citing and applying United States v. Murdock, 
290 U.S. 389 (1933»; see a/so United States v. Bishop, 412 U.S. 346 (1973). 
225 See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(8) (Official Draft 1985) (providing that "[ a] re-
quirement that an offense be committed wilfully is satisfied if a person acts knowingly with 
respect to the material elements of the offense, unless a purpose to impose further requirements 
appears"). See a/so Spies v. United States, 317 U.S. 492, 497 (1943) (observing that ''willful'' 
is "a word of many meanings"); Bryan v. United States, 524 U.S. 184,191 (1998). 
226 Ratz/af, 510 U.S. at 140 (citing 31 U.S.C. § 5324 (1993) (current version at Pub. L. No. 
107-56, title III, §§ 353(b), 363(b), 115 Stat. 323, 332 (2001»). 
227 Ratz/af, 510 U.S. at 140. 
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overlooks the application of section 5322, the Bank Secrecy Act's enforcement 
provision, to the Act's other regulatory requirements, many of which impose 
reporting or record-keeping obligations. As to them, the requirement of "will-
ful" conduct, conventionally understood-that is, that a person act with full 
awareness of the nature of his conduct-is hardly surplusage. Rather, it is ex-
actly the kind of notice-based scienter, requiring proof of "conduct awareness," 
to which legislatures traditionally have looked to answer their concern for fair 
notice in regulatory crime. The fact that the Bank Secrecy Act's overall 
criminal enforcement provision, with its requirement of willful behavior, also 
applies to the later added antistructuring provision, which by its terms requires 
that the actor act with a purpose independently satisfying the willfulness 
requirement, does not make that overall willfulness requirement surplusage. 
Section 5322's "willfully" requirement ensures that all violators of the Bank 
Secrecy Act have full "conduct notice" as a predicate to conviction. 
Moreover, the purpose requirement of the anti structuring provision, section 
5324, does more than simply duplicate the requirement of willful conduct. 
This purpose requirement limits criminality to only those structuring efforts 
which have no purpose other than avoiding a transaction report.228 That 
Congress's effort to narrowly define a regulatory offense, through the time-
honored practice of providing for an element of specific intent, has the ancillary 
effect of satisfying the Act's overall "willfulness" requirement does not make 
either statutory term surplusage.229 
228 As the Court recognized, there may well be reasons to structure one's cash transactions 
other than to avoid a report to Treasury. Id. at 144-45. 
229 As part of its argument that Congress intended "willfully" to provide for an ignorance-
of-the-law defense, the Court also asserted that courts of appeals had so read the term in its 
application to sections ofthe Bank Secrecy Act other than the anti structuring provision. Id. at 
141-42. However, as Justice Blackmun again pointed out, id. at 153-54 n.4 (Blackmun, J., 
dissenting), the Court overstated its case. Although many of the lower court decisions do 
interpret "willfully" to require knowledge of the law coupled with a "specific intent to commit 
the crime," id. at 141 (majority opinion) and cases cited, most of these cases stand for the 
conventional proposition that when applied to a crime of omission, such as failing to file a 
required report, "willfully" requires proof that the actor knew of the reporting requirement and 
intended to disobey it. They do not, however, further require proof that the actor knew his 
conduct was illegal. See, e.g., United States v. Granda, 565 F.2d 922, 926 (5th Cir. 1978) (cited 
in Ratzlaf, 510 U.S. at 141). Those few that go farther and read "willfully" to require proof that 
the actor knew also that his or her conduct was illegal mistakenly rest on Cheek, see, e.g., 
United States v. Sturman, 951 F.2d 1466, 1476--77 (6th Cir. 1991)(cited in Ratzlaf, 510 U.S. at 
142), which as discussed is expressly limited to the tax laws. See supra notes 221 & 222 and 
accompanying text. The Court's concern, then, that unless section 5322's "willfully" includes 
an ignorance-of-the-law defense as applied to the antistructuring provision it will have a 
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The legislative history was no more helpful to the Court's reading of 
"willfully," revealing that to the extent Congress focused on this issue it in-
tended the opposite result. The Court's answer to this contrary legislative 
history-that when statutory text is clear, there is no occasion to resort to 
legislative histori30-is hard to take seriously given its tortured reading of the 
statute. If the statute is clear, it is in the opposite direction. Moreover, in the 
next breath the Court appeared to retreat from its suggestion of textual clarity 
when it invoked the lenity principle as support for resolving the statute's textual 
ambiguity in favor of the defendant.231 
Why, then, in the face of contrary indications at every tum, did the Court 
insist on reading an ignorance-of-the-Iaw defense into the enforcement pro-
visions of the Bank Secrecy Act? The majority's opinion provides no clear 
answer, but a careful reading suggests that the Court's post-Liparota fusion of 
blame and notice lies at the heart of its analysis. In its brief, the government 
had argued that it was unnecessary to take the extraordinary step of ensuring 
actual notice to putative offenders through an ignorance-of-the-Iaw defense, 
asserting that "structuring is not the kind of activity that an ordinary person 
would engage in innocently.,,232 Although couched in the language of 
"innocence," this is a straightforward application of the constructive notice 
analysis on which cases like International Minerals and Boyce Motor Lines are 
premised.233 Persons knowingly engaged in the conduct forbidden by the 
statute or in activity regulated by it ordinarily have sufficient notice of potential 
criminal liability and need not be afforded the actual notice which an 
ignorance-of-the-Iaw defense would ensure. This analysis has nothing to do 
with blameworthiness, although to be sure if the conduct in question is blame-
worthy then constructive notice of illegality seems assured. 
different meaning than it has when applied to the other provisions of the Bank Secrecy Act was 
misplaced. By interpreting "willfully" to provide for an ignorance-of-the-Iaw defense the Court 
ensured a uniform construction for that term within the Bank Secrecy Act. However, it did so 
by abandoning the conventional interpretation of "willfully" which courts had long used without 
apparent difficulty, an interpretation rooted in the fundamental principle that ignorance of the 
law is no excuse. 
230 Ratzlaf, 510 U.S. at 147-48. 
231 Id. at 148-49. This is, first, a curious application ofthe lenity principle since the ambi-
guity seemed to be of the Court's own making. Moreover, it completely ignores the more 
fundamental principle that statutory ambiguity is to be resolved against, not in favor of, pro-
viding an ignorance-of-the-Iaw defense. See supra pp. 19-23,27-28,34,38-39. 
232Id. at 144 (quoting Brieffor United States at 29, Ratzlafv. United States, 510 U.S. 135 
(1994) (No. 92-1196)). 
233 See supra pp. 22-24, 31-33. 
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The Court nevertheless responded to this notice argument in the framework 
of blameworthiness, pointing out that currency structuring is not the exclusive 
province of "bad men.,,234 To demonstrate that "currency structuring is not 
inevitably nefarious,,,m the Court cited three hypothetically "non-nefarious" 
violators, then concluded: 
In light of these examples, we are unpersuaded by the argument that 
structuring is so obviously "evil" or inherently "bad" that the "willfulness" 
requirement is satisfied irrespective of the defendant's knowledge of the 
illegality of structuring. Had Congress wished to dispense with the 
requirement, it could have furnished the appropriate instruction?36 
This argument reveals how dramatically Liparota and its fusion of blame-
worthiness and notice concerns have altered the Court's scienter analysis. The 
presumption that the contours of the criminal law are known-and thus that 
ignorance of the law does not excuse-is not, as the Court in RatzlaJassumes, 
limited to crimes committed exclusively by "bad" or "nefarious" people. 
People who commit regulatory crimes are not necessarily "bad" people. Mr. 
Dotterweich, whose company may inadvertently have mislabeled some over-
the-counter drugs, was not thereby a "bad" person; Mr. Park, whose company 
had mice in one of its food storage warehouses, was not for that reason "nefari-
ous." But that is quite beside the point when the question is whether Congress, 
in enacting the respective regulatory statutes under which each was charged, 
intended a particular level of scienter, the proof of which would ensure a par-
ticular level of notice. In the cases of Mr. Dotterweich and Mr. Park, the Court 
held that Congress meant to impose something close to absolute liability, not 
because they were "bad actors" but because, due to the fields of activity in 
which these men were engaged and to the societal need for widespread "no ex-
cuses" enforcement, Congress was apparently satisfied that they had sufficient 
notice of criminal liability without proof that either knew or should have known 
of the violations, much less the law forbidding those violations.237 
The proper question regarding Mr. Ratzlaf, as well as those persons in the 
examples cited by the Court, is whether Congress was satisfied that by acting 
"willfully"-Le., mindful of the Bank Secrecy Act's reporting requirement and 
with a purpose to evade that requirement-they had sufficient notice of 
234 Ratzlaf, 510 U.S. at 144. 
235 [d. 
236 [d. at 146 (footnote omitted). 
237 See supra pp. 37-39. 
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possible criminality. The motives of the individual actors for their conduct are 
here irrelevant, as is their apparent moral culpability. The only relevant 
question is whether Congress believed something more than the constructive 
notice which would flow from proof that violators knew exactly what they were 
doing-hiding from the government something which the law required them to 
report-should be a part of the criminal enforcement of the Bank Secrecy Act. 
Nothing in the text or history of the statute remotely suggests such a con-
gressional concern. 
That the Court would state, as it did in concluding this part of its opinion, 
"[h]ad Congress wished to dispense with the requirement [that knowledge of 
the law be proved], it could have furnished the appropriate instruction,,,238 
shows just how topsy-turvy the Court's mens rea jurisprudence had become. 
U ntii Liparota, congressional silence concerning scienter was met with the pre-
sumption of scienter only when such scienter is blame-based. Here, the Court 
used the presumption of scienter as a basis for the requirement that knowledge 
of the criminal law itself be proved. Of course, that is exactly what the Court 
did in Liparota. But in Liparota, the Court at least tried to camouflage the 
defense it created as one of mistake-of-fact required by blameworthiness 
considerations so as to stay within the doctrinal use of the presumption?39 Nine 
years later, the blame/notice distinction was so frayed that either such doctrinal 
distortion no longer mattered or it was not even noticed.240 
IGNORANCE OF FACT: STAPLES 
If RatzlaJ marked the full impact of the Liparota approach to scienter on 
cases involving ignorance-of-the-Iaw defenses, Staples v. United States,241 
decided four months later, was its counterpart in those raising ignorance-of-fact 
claims.242 Harold Staples was charged under the National Firearms Acf43 with 
possessing an unregistered automatic rifle, that is, an assault rifle which fired 
continuously in response to a single trigger squeeze. This was the same statute 
238 Ratzlaf, 510 U.S. at 146. 
239 Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 425 n.9 (1985). 
240 Although Justice Blackmun in his dissent plainly appreciates the notice orientation of 
the issue before the Court and the irrelevance of the forbidden conduct's inherent "evil," he, too, 
accepts the decisional axis ofinnocentlwrongful conduct "in exceptional cases." Ratzlaf, 510 
U.S. at 155 n.6 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
241 511 U.S. 600 (1994). 
242Id. at 609-12. 
243 National Fireanns Act, 26 U.S.C. §§ 5801-5872 (1986) (current version at 26 U.S.C. 
§§ 5801-5872 (2000)). 
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which the Court had reviewed twenty-three years earlier in United States v. 
Freed. 244 Section 5861 (d) of the Act made it a crime punishable by up to ten 
years imprisonment for any person "to receive or possess a firearm which is not 
registered to him,,,245 and other sections of the Act defined "firearm" to include 
an automatic rifle such as the one Staples possessed.246 In Freed, the Court 
decided that the Act required no scienter for the registration element, basing its 
interpretation on the lack of any mens rea term in the statute along with the 
statute's regulatory nature.247 
The firearms possessed in Freed were hand grenades, which as Justice 
Douglas noted by their appearance suggested the possibility of regulation and 
the attendant requirement of registration.248 Staples's assault rifle, however, 
was arguably not so obviously regulated. By its outward appearance, Staples's 
assault rifle could not be distinguished from a semiautomatic rifle, which was 
not covered by the Act.249 Staples claimed that he did not know that his rifle 
was automatic.250 This mistake concerning the gun's capacity for automatic fire 
would constitute a cognizable defense only if the statute required scienter for 
that circumstance element. 
Analysis of Staples's scienter claim would seem to be straightforward. The 
National Firearms Act was enacted to regulate and restrict the possession ofa 
narrow class of dangerous weaponry.251 In Freed, the Court had recognized 
violations of its provisions as regulatory offenses standing on different ground 
from those rooted in the common law.252 The statute itself, as noted above, 
contains no term of scienter, and given the regulatory nature of the statute there 
is no basis to presume the existence of such an element. If a term of mens rea 
were to be inferred, it could only come from evidence of congressional concern 
that proof of heightened "conduct awareness" was necessary to strike the 
244 United States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601,607 (1971). See supra pp. 35-37. 
245 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d) (1968) (invalidated by United States v. Vest, 448 F. Supp. 2d 
1002, 1003 (S.D. Ill. 2006)). The Act's punishment provisions are set forth in 26 U.S.C. § 5871 
(1984). 
246 26 U.S.C. § 5845 (1986) (current version at 26 U.S.C. 5845 (2000)). 
247 See supra pp. 35-37. 
248'Freed, 401 U.S. at 607-09. 
249 Id. at 608. 
250Id. at 607. 
251 In his dissent, Justice Stevens carefully reviews the legislative history of the Act, a his-
tory which leaves no doubt as to the Act's regulatory character. Staples v. United States, 511 
U.S. 600,626-29 (1994) (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas, writing for the majority, 
does not quarrel with that characterization. Id. at 606-07 (majority opinion). 
252 Freed, 401 U.S. at 607-09. 
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proper balance between the need for broad enforcement of the regulatory 
provision on the one hand and the potential for unfair or arbitrary enforcement 
on the other. 
Here, the Court was not writing on a blank: slate. The district court in 
Staples's trial, drawing on circuit court decisions,253 instructed the jury that the 
government must prove that Staples knew he possessed a gun and "that he 
[was] dealing with a dangerous device of a type as would alert one to the likely-
hood of regulation. ,,254 The question for the Court, then, was whether Congress 
intended more notice to putative violators than would be assured by such a jury 
determination. 
The language of the statute yields no evidence of such legislative intent. 
As noted, there is no term of scienter whatsoever, and the Act considered as a 
whole suggests this omission was an intentional component of an overall 
legislative scheme strictly to regulate the dangerous weaponry favored by 
gangsters.255 As was so for the Bank: Secrecy Act considered by the Court in 
RatzlaJ,256 to the extent that the National Firearms Act's legislative history 
reveals anything concerning the existence of notice-based scienter, the history 
seems to speak against rather than for it.257 Finally, even if the statute itself and 
its legislative history were less clear on this point than they appear to be, such 
legislative ambiguity would not provide any basis to infer the notice-based 
element of "knowledge" for which Staples argued. A court should not infer 
that the legislature intended a notice-based mens rea term unless it is apparent 
from the statutory context that the balance of the need for strict enforcement on 
the one hand and the potential for unfair impact or arbitrary enforcement on the 
other suggests it.258 
If anything, the notice balance in Staples pointed away from, not toward, 
requiring proof that offenders knew the characteristics oftheir weapons which 
made their possession criminal. On the need side of the balance, strict enforce-
ment of the regulatory regime would appear to be quite important. The point of 
the legislation was tQ permit the government to keep track of what was 
253 See, e.g., Sipes v. United States, 321 F.2d 174, 179 (8th Cir. 1963). 
254 Staples, 511 U.S. at 604. 
255 Justice Stevens makes this point well in his dissent. Id. at 626-27 (Stevens, J., 
dissenting). 
256 See, e.g., Ratzlafv. United States, 510 U.S. 135 (1994). 
257 Staples, 511 U.S. at 626-27 (setting forth pertinent legislative history). It is telling in 
this regard that Justice Thomas's opinion for the majority did not once mention the legislative 
history ofthe Act. See id. 601-10 (majority opinion). 
258 See supra pp. 20-23. 
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essentially military weaponry, thereby limiting its circulation. The Act was not 
concerned with pistols or guns of the type that might be of legitimate use to 
householders or sportsmen. Rather, the Act was limited in scope to such 
weapons as machine guns, hand grenades and artillery pieces, weapons that 
pose a serious threat to public safety.259 The need for broad, excuse-free en-
forcement of the Act thus appears substantial. 
On the other hand, the potential for unfair or arbitrary enforcement of the 
Act in the absence of the "knowledge" element for which Staples argued seems 
relatively low. To be sure, absolute liability-that is, enforcement in complete 
disregard of what a possessor might know concerning a weapon regulated by 
the Act-might work some unfairness. However, the Act had long been inter-
preted to require proof at least that the possessor knew the item in question was 
a gun. As noted, the district court in Staples went further, requiring in addition 
proof that Mr. Staples knew that he possessed "a dangerous device ofa type as 
would alert one to the likelihood of regulation.,,26o Proof of such knowledge, 
coupled with the type and appearance of the weapons in question-in Staples's 
case, an assault rifle identical in appearance to an M-l6-would seem to be 
more than adequate to cabin the potential for unfair enforcement.261 At the very 
least it would seem that a congressional judgment so striking the notice balance 
259 Far from being silent on this point, the legislative history of the Act was replete with 
this concern. Staples, 511 U.S. at 626-28 nn.4-5 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
260Id. at 604 (majority opinion). 
261 Taking his cue directly from Liparota, Justice Thomas reasoned that because the lawful 
ownership of guns was so widespread their possession was "innocent" conduct from which 
constructive notice of the Act's prohibition would not flow. Id. Even assuming, as Justice 
Thomas did here, that "[g]uns in general are not 'deleterious devices or products or obnoxious 
waste materials,' [which were the subject of regulation in] International Minerals, that put their 
owners on notice that they stand 'in responsible relation to a public danger,'" id. at 610-11, 
"guns in general" were not what the Act prohibited possessing. Rather, the Act prohibited the 
possession of military weapons, a few of which-including the assault rifle which Staples 
possessed-were, unless closely examined, indistinguishable from a class of semiautomatic 
weapons which were lawful to possess. Moreover, in expressing his concern that "innocent" 
persons might be prosecuted, Justice Thomas chose to ignore that this relevant "notice class" of 
weapons was further narrowed by the requirement imposed by the district court that Staples 
"[knew] that he [was] dealing with a dangerous device of a type as would alert one to the 
likelihood of regulation." Id. at 604. The question of unfair notice, then, was not whether 
owning a gun was so "innocent" that gun owners "in general" would not fairly appreciate the 
likelihood of criminal regulation. The question was instead whether there was a potential for 
unfair or arbitrary enforcement ofthe Act given that potential violators must be proven (l) to 
have possessed a weapon in the subject class, i.e., a piece of military weaponry, and (2) to have 
actually understood that the weapon possessed was a dangerous device likely to be subject to 
regulation. Id. at 605. Innocence, with its patina of blamelessness, was not at issue. Id. 
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would not be so implausible that a further element of notice-based scienter 
should be inferred in the absence of explicit legislative direction. 
Yet this is what the Court did in Staples. In an opinion by Justice Thomas, 
the Court read the statute to require proof that Mr. Staples knew the particular 
characteristics of his rifle which subjected it to the Act's regulation, basing its 
holding on the common law presumption of mens rea?62 The Court here 
ignored the important difference between common law mens rea rooted in 
blameworthiness and the requirement of scienter intended to assure construc-
tive notice in regulatory crimes. The Court's discussion of implied mens rea 
instead proceeded on the explicit assumption that the common law presumption 
of mens rea applied virtually across the board, citing Balint, Morissette, 
Gypsum, and Liparota for this point.263 
If the Court meant to underscore the apparent collapse of the blame/notice 
distinction in its mens rea analysis, it could not have chosen four better cases. 
Balint, of course, was the case in which the Court had refused to apply the 
common law presumption of mens rea in interpreting regulatory crimes (such 
as that created by the National Firearms Act) that had no element of scienter on 
their face.264 Morissette, at the other end of the spectrum, was the case in 
which the Court reaffrrmed the continuing presumption of mens rea applicable 
to codified common law crimes, making clear in its analysis the distinction 
between such crimes of blame and crimes of a regulatory nature like the nar-
cotics offense in Balint.265 While Gypsum marked the careful employment of 
notice-based scienter,266 Liparota collapsed the carefully drawn distinction 
between notice and blame as a basis for inferring mens rea.267 
Justice Thomas did not go so far as to presume mens rea for all crimes. He 
acknowledged that in "limited circumstances,,268 Congress had enacted public-
welfare offenses in which it intended that there be no term of scienter. 269 But 
having said that, he went on to note "the particular care we have taken to avoid 
construing a statute to dispense with mens rea where doing so would 
'criminalize a broad range of apparently innocent conduct. ",270 This concern 
262 Id. at 605-06. 
263 !d. 
264 See United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250 (1922). 
265 See Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246 (1952). 
266 See United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422 (1978). 
267 See Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419 (1985). 
268 Staples, 511 U.S. at 607 (quoting Gypsum, 438 U.S. at 437). 
269 Staples, 511 U.S. at 606-07. 
270Id. at 610 (quoting Liparota, 471 U.S. at 426). 
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for criminalizing innocent conduct came from Liparota, which Justice Thomas 
noted interpreted the Food Stamp Act to provide for an ignorance-of-the-Iaw 
defense "largely because dispensing with such a mens rea requirement would 
have resulted in reading the statute to outlaw a number of apparently innocent 
acts.,,27I 
Of course, prohibiting "innocent" acts, i.e., acts not worthy of moral 
condernnation,272 is precisely what regulatory statutes are designed to do. But 
after Liparota and its progeny, blameworthiness and innocence form the axis 
about which scienter analysis presumptively revolves.273 The effect, of course, 
is to all but do away with serious regulatory crimes.274 So, when Justice 
271 Staples, 511 U.S. at 610. 
272 The Court erased any doubt that by "innocent" it meant "blameless" when in the same 
sentence it reaffirmed Liparota's holding that the Food Stamp Act did not in its eyes create a 
public welfare offense. Id. 
273 This focus on blameworthiness as the principal fountainhead of mens rea continues in 
the Court's post-Staples interpretive efforts. See, e.g., Carter v. United States, 530 U.S. 255, 
269 (2000) ("The presumption in favor of scienter requires a court to read into a statute only 
that mens rea which is necessary to separate wrongful conduct from 'otherwise innocent 
conduct."') (quoting United States v. X-Citement Video, 513 U.S. 64,72 (1994) and citing 
Staples, 511 U.S. 600). One could argue that the Court's opinion in Arthur Andersen v. United 
States, 544 U.S. 696 (2005), its most recent foray into the world of mens rea, in part was 
founded on notice principles. In Andersen, the Court interpreted the federal obstruction of 
justice statute, which forbids "knowingly ... corruptly persuad[ing]" another to destroy docu-
ments with the intent to impair their availability at an official proceeding, to require proof that 
the accused was "conscious of [his or her] wrongdoing," not just that the accused knew the 
nature of the persuasive act. Id. at 706. The Court began its analysis by noting that concerns 
for fair warning had informed what the Court characterized as its "traditional[] ... restraint in 
assessing the reach of a federai criminal statute," id. at 703 (quoting United States v. Aguilar, 
515 U.S. 593,600 (1995», and went on to express concern that the act of persuading another to 
withhold or even to destroy documents that were relevant to an official proceeding was not 
inherently "corrupt," giving as an example advice of counsel to withhold privileged documents 
from production in an official proceeding. Andersen, 544 U.S. at 704. However, the Court's 
reference to "fair warning" was no more than an implicit reference to the rule ofienity, and its 
interpretation of the statutory terms "knowingly ... corrupt[]" to mean "conscious of wrong-
doing" is hardly a shift away from blameworthiness as the fulcrum of its mens rea analysis. Id. 
at 703, 706. Indeed, as the Court surveyed its interpretive work, it observed, "limiting 
criminality to persuaders conscious of their wrongdoing sensibly allows [the obstruction statute] 
to reach only those with the level of 'culpability ... we usually require in order to impose crim-
inalliability.'" Id. at 706 (quoting Aguilar, 515 U.S. at 602). 
274 In the concluding section of his scienter analysis, Justice Thomas dwelled at some 
length on the harshness of the penalty involved-particularly a ten year prison sentence. Citing 
Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246 (1952), he suggested that this fact was virtually 
dispositive on the "public welfare status" of the Act and thus on the issue of scienter. Staples, 
62 UNIVERSITY OF LOUISVILLE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46 
Thomas in Staples observed that "there can be little doubt that, as in Liparota, 
the Government's construction ofthe [Act] potentially would impose criminal 
sanctions on a class of persons whose mental state-ignorance of the 
characteristics of the weapons in their possession-makes their actions entirely 
innocent,,,275 he meant to end the discussion, not to begin it. That regulatory 
crime is intended to penalize conduct without relation to blame, leaving only 
the question of what notice seems fair in the context of the regulatory need, is a 
proposition which the Court seems no longer to accept.276 Only if the Congress 
is explicit, presumably on the face of the statute, about such an intention to 
511 U.S. at 616-18. Such a sweeping conclusion is unjustified. To be sure, the Court in 
Morissette identified the harshness of punishment as a factor relevant to identifying regulatory 
offenses. Morissette, 342 U.S. at 248. However, it was but a factor, and one which had its 
primary utility in the absence of clearly articulated legislative intent. Id. In other cases, such as 
United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250 (1922) and United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277 
(1943), which the Court here ignored, the Court had no difficulty in recognizing the 
congressional intent to create a regulatory offense which provided for lengthy imprisonment. 
Moreover, the Court in Morissette was speaking in the context of interpreting a statute which 
codified a traditional common law crime, a distinction which Justice Thomas again overlooked. 
Morissette, 342 U.S. at 249. 
In the end, the harshness of the penalty is an important factor in attempting to divine 
unarticulated legislative intent concerning the quality of notice intended to be assured by a 
regulatory crime. The harsher the penalty, the greater the degree of notice intended. But, 
contrary to the Court's suggestion, the penalty should not be dispositive. 
275 Staples, 511 U.S. at 614-15. 
276 Nowhere does the Court make this more clear than in the last paragraph of its principal 
scienter analysis, Part II.B of its opinion. There Justice Thomas concluded: 
We concur in the Fifth Circuit's conclusion on this point: "It is unthinkable to us that 
Congress intended to subject such law-abiding, well-intentioned citizens to a possible 
ten-year term of imprisonment if ... what they genuinely and reasonably believed 
was a conventional semiautomatic [weapon] turns out to have worn down into or 
been secretly modified to be a fully automatic weapon." As we noted in Morissette, 
the "purpose and obvious effect of doing away with the requirement of a guilty intent 
is to ease the prosecution's path to conviction." We are reluctant to impute that 
purpose to Congress where, as here, it would mean easing the path to convicting per-
sons whose conduct would not even alert them to the probability of strict regulation 
in the form of a statute such as § 5861 (d). 
Id. at 615-16 (citations and footnotes omitted). 
Convicting persons of regulatory crimes without proof of mens rea is now "unthinkable." 
The Court went on to say in the footnote accompanying the quoted text that "if Congress thinks 
it necessary to reduce the Government's burden at trial to ensure proper enforcement of the Act, 
it remains free to amend § 5861(d) by explicitly eliminating a mens rea requirement." Id. at616 
n.ll. It thus appears that without such explicit textual negation of scienter, serious public 
welfare crimes no longer exist. 
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penalize without blame does the Court seem willing to recognize it.277 Even 
then, it seems open to question whether the Court is willing to accept a dimin-
ished scienter requirement in federal regulatory crime. Such a revolution in the 
interpretation of criminal statutes, undoing a conceptual framework which took 
more than fifty years fully to evolve, seems well beyond what Congress intend-
ed. It is thus particularly ironic that the Court claimed as its mandate in Staples 
the interpretation of congressional intent.278 
THE DOCTRINAL EPILOG 
What has emerged as the lower courts confront this "vexatious problem,,279 
of mens rea in federal criminal statutes after Liparota, RatzlaJ and Staples is a 
wooden and sometimes distorted analytic construct. Gone is the possibility of 
openly notice-based analysis in considering whether a regulatory statute 
implicitly provides for some level of mens rea or in determining the reach and 
meaning of a mens rea term in such a statute. In its place is a set of seemingly 
inflexible principles that govern the courts' interpretive efforts in this regard. 
First, RatzlaJ appears to have opened the door to, if not quite mandated, the 
interpretation of "willfully" to provide for an ignorance-of-the-Iaw defense?SO 
277 So, the Court concluded its opinion in Staples with the observation that "our holding 
depends critically on our view that if Congress had intended to make outlaws of gun owners 
who were wholly ignorant of the offending characteristics of their weapons, and to subject them 
to lengthy prison terms, it would have spoken more clearly to that effect." Id. at 620 (citation 
omitted). 
278 The Court's full commitment to the merger of notice and blame in its scienter analysis 
continued in Posters 'N' Things Ltd. v. United States, 511 U.S. 513 (1994), and United States v. 
X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64 (1994), although perhaps not as blatantly as in Staples. In 
both Posters 'N' Things and X-Citement Videos, the Court was asked to determine the level of 
scienter required by a regulatory or public welfare statute, and in both the Court began with the 
presumption that scienter was required, the only question being what kind. Posters 'N'Things, 
511 U.S. at 517-18; X-Citement Video, 513 U.S. at 69. In both, there was a strong argument for 
a narrowly crafted or narrowly based scienter requirement, but in both the Court took the 
broader presumptive path staked out in Liparota and Staples. Posters 'N' Things, 511 U.S. at 
526; X-Citement Video, 513 U.S. at 72. 
279 United States v. Bronx Reptiles, Inc., 217 F.3d 82,83 (2d Cir. 2000). 
280 See generally Sharon L. Davies, The Jurisprudence o/Willfulness: An Evolving Theory 
o/Excusable Ignorance, 48 DUKEL.J. 341-42 (1998). Butc! Bryan v. United States, 524 U.S. 
184, 193-95 (1998) (holding that to prove "willful" violation ofthe federal statute forbidding 
the unlicensed sale of firearms the Government need only prove that the defendant knew that his 
conduct was unlawful, not that he further knew of the specific law that he violated, i.e., the law 
requiring a license to sell). While Bryan hardly marks a full restoration of the ignorance-of -the-
law doctrine, it distinguishes Ratzla/s reading of "willful," id. at 194-99, and marks a step back 
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There is, of course, the potential for predictability in this interpretive command, 
although its reach is still far from clear. When coupled with the Court's refusal 
in International Minerals to read "knowingly violate any such regulation" to 
provide for a mistake-of-Iaw defense,28t this provides a relatively clear 
demarcation, notwithstanding the contrary holding of Liparota. Absent very 
explicit indications in the legislative history, courts have declined to read 
"knowingly" as a specific-intent provision providing for a mistake-of-Iaw de-
fense, reserving that meaning for "willfully. ,,282 Although it may not well serve 
from the general application of the "ignorance-of-this-specific-Iaw" defense suggested by 
RatzlaJand its interpretation of "willful." 
Courts of appeals have picked up on this distinction. See, e.g., United States v. Bursey, 
416 F.3d 301, 308-09 (4th Cir. 2005) (holding that "willfully" as used in 18 U.S.C. 
§ I 752(a)(I )(ii) (2000), punishing one who enters or remains in a restricted area where the 
President is visiting, requires proof only that the offender knew that his conduct was unlawful 
but not that he knew of the particular statute or regulation that forbade his conduct); United 
States v. Whab, 355 F.3d 155, 161-62 (2d Cir. 2004) (holding that "willfully" as used in 18 
U.S.C. § 1001 (2000) (current version at Pub. L. No. 109-248, title I, § 141(c), 120 Stat. 603 
(2006», punishing the making of a false statement to a federal agent, required at most proof that 
the accused knew that his conduct was unlawful, and further suggesting even that proof may not 
be required); United States v. Henderson, 243 F.3d 1168, 1173 (9th Cir. 2001) (interpreting 
"willfully" as used in 43 U.S.C. § 1733(a), the statute punishing violations of the Bureau of 
Land Management regulations, to require proof that the offending conduct was unlawful but 
reserving on whether there must be further proof that the offender must know of the regulation 
in question). 
Even before Bryan's apparent pruning of Ratzlafs reach, there were circuit courts that, in 
spite of Ratzlaf, resisted interpreting "willfully" to require proof of knowledge that the conduct 
was unlawful, at least in crimes that had long been interpreted to require no such proof See, 
e.g., United States v. Daughtry, 48 F.3d 829, 831-32 (4thCir. 1995), vacated on other grounds, 
516 U.S. 984 (1995) (holding that ''willfully'' as used in 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1976), punishing 
false statements to a federal agent, required proof that the accused knew that the statement was 
false but not that such an act was unlawful); United States v. Rodriguez-Rios, 14 F.3d 1040, 
1048 n.21 (5th Cir. 1994) (en bane) (dictum) (same). 
281 United States v. Int'I Minerals, 402 U.S. 558,560, 563 (1971). See supra pp. 37-39. 
282 See, e.g., United States v. Pasillas-Gaytan, 192 F.3d 864, 867 (9th Cir. 1999) (so 
interpreting 18 U.S.C .. § 1546(a) (1996) (current version at Pub. L. No. 107-273, div. B, title 
IV, § 4002(a)(3), 116 Stat. 1806 (2002» forbidding unlawful procurement of immigration); 
United States v. Kelley Technical Coatings, Inc., 157 F.3d 432, 438 (6th Cir. 1998) (so 
interpreting 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d)(2)(A) (1986) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d)(2)(A) 
(2000», the Federal Resource Conservation and Recovery Act); United States v. Sinskey, 119 
F.3d 712, 717 (8th Cir. 1997) (so interpreting 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(2)(A), the Federal Clean 
Water Act); United States v. Obiechie, 38 F.3d 309, 315 (7th Cir. 1994) (so interpreting 18 
U.S.C. § 924(a)(I)(A) (invalidated by U.S. v. Harris, 397 F.3d 404, 405 (6th Cir. 2005», 
forbidding willfully dealing firearms without a license). 
As noted above, four years after Ratzlaf, the Court in Bryan v. United States, 524 U.S. 184 
(1998) endorsed this dichotomy. In Bryan, the Court was called on to interpret "willfully" as 
used in the Firearm Owners' Protection Act, which as noted it held to require proof that a 
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the intentions of Congress with respect to the meaning of the substantial num-
ber of statutes in which "willfully" appears, it at least serves as clear guidance 
to congressional drafters for future regulatory statutes. If one intends to provide 
for a mistake-of-Iaw defense (or at least to leave the door open), use 
"willfully;,,283 if not, use "knowingly." 
The impact of Staples is more pernicious. Its only apparent benefit is for 
those who, as a normative matter, disapprove of strict criminalliability?84 The 
Court's holding serves as an imperfect proxy for the due process requirement of 
mens rea that the Court refused to find in Balint and that many commentators 
hoped could be read into Lambert.285 If one takes the view that mens rea, as a 
matter of substantive due process, should be a part of every serious crime, say 
every felony, Staples comes pretty close to that result, albeit on statutory not 
constitutional grounds. Its mandate, as read by the lower courts, seems clear, 
uncomplicated by any interest balancing which should attend notice analysis. 
Except for a limited class of "public welfare" crimes, Morissette's traditional 
presumption of mens rea applies to all crimes, requiring scienter for those 
elements that criminalize otherwise "innocent conduct. ,,286 As to the "limited" 
person selling a gun without a permit knew that his conduct was unlawful (but not specifically 
that a permit was required), and so it is not clear that its observation concerning the meaning of 
"knowingly" constitutes a holding as such. Id. at 193. But the line that the Court drew between 
the two terms could not have been more clear. In its words, 
unless the text of the statue dictates a different result, the term "knowingly" merely 
requires proof of knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense .... More is re-
quired, however, ... [for] "willfully." The jury must find that the defendant acted 
with an evil-meaning mind, that is to say, that he acted with knowledge that his con-
duct was unlawful. 
Id. (citations omitted). In a footnote and without illumination, the Court treated Liparota as a 
case in which the statutory text dictated the expansion of "knowingly" to include knowledge 
that the conduct was unlawful. Id. at 193 n.15. 
283 But see supra note 280, citing a sampling of cases in courts that have declined to read 
''willfully'' to provide for a mistake-of-law defense. 
284 See, e.g., supra note 53. See also Markus Dirk Dubber, Toward a Constitutional Law 
of Crime and Punishment, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 509 (2004); Kennedy, supra note 52; Richard 
Singer & Douglas Husak, Of Innocence and Innocents: The Supreme Court and Mens Rea Since 
Herbert Packer, 2 BUFF. CRIM. L. REv. 859 (1999). 
285 See supra note 118. 
286 Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419,426 (1985) ("This construction [requiring 
proof that the accused knew that his sale of food stamps was unauthorized] is particularly 
appropriate where, as here, to interpret the statute otherwise would be to crirninalize a broad 
range of innocent conduct."); Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 614-15 (1994) ("Here, 
there can be little doubt that, as in Liparota, the Government's construction of the statute 
potentially would impose criminal sanctions on a class of persons whose mental state--
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class of public welfare crimes not subject to this presumption of mens rea, the 
operative assumption seems to be that they are intended to be crimes of strict 
liability.287 There is in this duality no room for mens rea as an instrument of 
notice. Scienter either automatically flows from the blame-based presumption 
of Morissette, even if the concern for criminalizing "otherwise innocent con-
duct" is one of notice, or it disappears altogether into the black hole of strict 
liability. To say the least, this all-or-nothing approach is a blunt instrument to 
deal with the conflicting interests that are implicated in typical notice analysis, 
and many of the cases struggling to adapt this inapt tool to the often complex 
interpretive task in question illustrate the analytic distortions that can result. 
Take, for example, United States v. Ahmad/88 a case in which the Fifth 
Circuit reviewed a conviction of a gas station owner under the Clean Water Act 
for dumping several thousand gallons of gasoline and gasolirie-contaminated 
water into a storm sewer.289 The Act provides that it is a felony to "knowingly" 
violate of any of its sections, one of which forbids the discharge, without a 
permit, of a pollutant into navigable water of the United States.z90 Ahmad 
sought to defend by claiming that he thought what he was dumping into the 
ignorance of the characteristics of weapons in their possession-makes them entirely in-
nocent.") (footnote omitted). 
287 The Court in Staples was unclear in this regard, and as seen below, some lower courts 
have read it to permit some mistake or ignorance-of-fact defenses. See, e.g., United States v. 
Wilson, 133 F.3d 251, 263 (4th Cir. 1997) (citing Staples for the proposition that "[e]ven under 
this public welfare doctrine, however, true or rigid strict liability does not generally follow, as 
ignorance of the facts usually remains a defense"). The genesis ofthis notion is a footnote in 
Staples conceding, and explaining away, the Court's earlier observation in International 
Minerals that so-called public welfare offenses generally are thought "to require at least that the 
defendant know that he is dealing with some dangerous or deleterious substance" and thus that 
the Court has "avoided construing criminal statutes to impose a rigorous form of strict liability." 
Staples, 511 U.S. at 607 n.3. The Court went on to observe, in the same footnote: 
[W]e have referred to public welfare offenses as "dispensing with" or "eliminating" a 
mens rea requirement or "mental element" [citing Morissette and Dotterweich] and 
have described them as strict liability crimes [citing Gypsum]. While use of the term 
"strict liability" is really a misnomer, we have interpreted statutes defining public 
welfare offenses to eliminate the requirement of mens rea; that is, the requirement of 
a "guilty mind" with respect to an element of a crime. Under such statutes we have 
not required that the defendant know the facts that make his conduct fit the definition 
of the offense. 
Id. This language is hardly a firm basis for saying, as does the Fourth Circuit in Wilson, that in 
public welfare offenses "ignorance of the facts usually remains a defense," and most courts have 
not so read it. See, e.g., United States v. Figueroa, 165 F .3d Ill, 116-17 (2d Cir. 1998). 
288 101 F.3d 386 (5th Cir. 1996). 
289Id. at 388. 
290Id. 
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sewer was water, not gasoline.291 Such a mistake-of-fact defense would only be 
cognizable if the Act requires proof that he was aware of the nature of his 
discharge.292 
The government predictably argued that the Clean Water Act is a reg-
ulatory crime and that as such all that was required to satisfy the knowledge 
element was proof that Ahmad knew he was discharging something into the 
sewer (as opposed to an accidental discharge). The Fifth Circuit conceded that 
the Act "[o]n its face ... does appear to implicate public welfare. ,,293 However, 
apparently concerned about the prospect of strict felony liability, the court 
resisted this categorization of the Act, citing Staples for the ostensible clarify-
cation that "[public welfare] offenses involve statutes that regulate potentially 
harmful or injurious items,,,294 and then observing that, although gasoline seems 
"potentially harmful or injurious," it is "certainly no more so than machine 
guns.,,295 With the escape hatch thus open, the court returned to Staples for the 
"key to public welfare offense analysis," that being "whether' dispensing with 
mens rea would require the defendant to have knowledge only of traditionally 
lawful conduct, ",296 i.e., the "innocent conduct" concern. The court applied 
this test to Ahmad's case, finding that it was satisfied because, without proof 
that Ahmad knew that he was discharging a pollutant, he (and others like him) 
could be convicted of a felony for pumping what he believed to be water into 
the sewer. So, the court held that the Clean Water Act is not a public welfare 
offense-at least insofar as it forbids discharging pollutants into navigable 
water without a permit-and thus the "usual presumption of a mens rea re-
quirement applies.,,297 
However defensible this result may be, or may feel, the logic is tortured. 
Reduced to its essentials, the reasoning is purely instrumental. The Fifth Cir-
cuit ignored what it conceded to be so--that the Clean Water Act is quin-
291 Id. at 388-89. 
292 Id. at 390. 
293 Id. at 391. 
294Id. 
295Id. 
296Id. See also United States v. Bronx Reptiles, Inc., 217 F.3d 82, 90-91 (2d Cir. 2000) 
(taking a similar "innocent-conduct" approach in deciding that the statute in question, there the 
Lacey Act, which forbids permitting wild animals to be transported into the United States under 
inhumane or unhealthy conditions, 18 U.S.C. § 42(c) (1952)) (current version at Pub. L. No. 
104-332, § 2(h)(I), 110 Stat. 4091 (1996)), requires proof that the accused knew of the of-
fending conditions under which the animals were being transported). 
297 I d. 
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tessentially a regulatory crime designed to protect the public from potentially 
hazardous substances. Instead, the court first decided whether it is possible that 
the applicability of the statute could surprise a person who, like Ahmad, had 
done what the statute prohibited; that is, does the statute raise a potential notice 
concern? If that possibility exists (as the Fifth Circuit found to be so in 
Ahmad), then it might be necessary to infer-as a matter oflegislative intent-
some element of knowledge (in Ahmad, knowledge of what he discharged) to 
address that notice concern. In a pre-Staples world, the analysis should then 
balance this concern for notice against any apparent need for excuse-free 
enforcement; the regulatory or "public welfare" concern underlying the statute 
would be but a factor in the balancing. However, if Staples means what it says, 
once a statute is deemed to be regulatory, the inquiry is effectively over. A 
mens rea element is only possible (but is virtually automatic) if the statute is 
not regulatory, not a crime of "public welfare." So, to address its concern for 
notice, the Fifth Circuit did what it had to, and held that the Clean Water Act is 
not a public welfare, regulatory crime but instead a traditional crime, subject to 
the "usual" presumption of mens rea. 298 
If the court had felt free to recognize the statute's regulatory character and 
then to further consider the notice issue in light of the statute's text, legislative 
history, and purpose, weighing the congressional concerns for full enforcement 
of this important environmental legislation against the concerns relating to its 
298 Ahmad, 101 F.3d at 391 ("Following Staples, we hold that the offenses charged in 
counts one and two are not public welfare offenses and that the usual presumption of a mens rea 
requirement applies. With the exception of purely jurisdictional elements, the mens rea of 
knowledge applies to each element of the crimes."). As noted, the Fifth Circuit's analysis was 
focused on the notice concern of a criminal statute reaching the conduct of one who might be 
unfairly surprised that his conduct was potentially criminal. As developed above, the traditional 
blame-based presumption of mens rea is an inapt way to respond to this concern. 
There may be, however, a different argument that would provide a better conceptual fit, at 
least to this crime. Although enacted as part ofa comprehensive regulatory scheme, the Act's 
prohibition against dumping a pollutant, here gasoline or gasoline-contaminated water, into the 
nation's water supply may be seen as a consensus norm in our increasingly environmentally 
conscious society. See HALL, supra note 3, at 340-41 (arguing that the common law mala in 
selmala prohibita distinction is an artificial, inflexible guide in determining whether or not mens 
rea is an element of a crime). If that were so, it might be fair to treat it as a crime imbued with 
blame, one which is thus subject to the traditional presumption articulated in Morissette. Put 
another way, if the judgment of society---expressed in this statute-is that one who empties the 
polluted contents of his gasoline-storage tank into our water is not just a businessman who 
violated federal regulations but rather a morally blameworthy person subject to the formal 
societal censure of a criminal conviction, it is appropriate to require proof of sufficient mens rea 
to merit the judgment of blame that flows from such a conviction. 
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potential unfairness to those to whom it might apply, the result might well have 
been the same. Maybe the Fifth Circuit considered those factors in deciding 
this case; maybe not. We will never know, but what we do know is that its 
reasoning is thin cover for its apparent goal. 
Other courts have avoided this analytic trap by reading a little more leeway 
into the doctrinal construct that emerged from Staples. In United States v. 
Lynch/99 the case involving the skull finder prosecuted under the Archae-
ological Resource Protection Act discussed at the outset,300 the Ninth Circuit 
side-stepped the question of whether the statute was a public welfare measure, 
opining that the defendant's conduct, picking up a human skull, was as a 
categorical matter neither an act that was malum in se nor one that involved 
public welfare.3ot Putting aside whether the defendant's conduct is an 
appropriate measure of the statute's character, the court at least freed itself from 
the constraints of Staples's public welfare/traditional-crime duality and thus felt 
able to address its concern that ARPA might tum a casual souvenir collector 
such as Lynch into an unwitting felon. It addressed this fair-warning concern 
by resort to the traditional, blame-based presumption in favor of mens rea; the 
court had no occasion under this approach to consider the possibility that 
Congress intended strict, excuse-free enforcement of the statute to advance the 
important societal interest of protecting archaeological treasures?02 Again, this 
might be the right result under a full notice analysis, but any consideration of 
the government's interest in excuse-free enforcement (and there was evidence 
of just such a concern in ARPA's legislative history) and the attendant 
balancing of that interest against the perceived potential for unfairness occurred 
behind the judicial curtain; Staples and its progeny leave no room for openly 
notice-based mens rea. 
If the Ninth Circuit in Lynch avoided pigeon-holing ARPA as either a 
public welfare or a traditional crime and thus avoided the government's 
argument that "knowingly" did not reach the element in question, the Fourth 
Circuit in United States v. Wilson303 took a more head-on approach, reading 
International Minerals and Staples to allow for a mistake-of-fact defense even 
in public welfare crimes.304 To say the least, this overreads Staples.305 The 
299 233 F.3d 1139 (9th Cir. 2000). 
300 See supra pp. 3-5. 
301 Lynch, 233 F.3d at 1143. 
3021d. at 1144-46. 
303 133 F.3d 251 (4th Cir. 1997). 
304 ld. at 263. 
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basis for this assertion is a footnote in Staples in which Justice Thomas 
conceded, and explained away, the Court's earlier observation in International 
Minerals that so-called public welfare offenses generally are thought "to 
require at least that the defendant know that he is dealing with some dangerous 
or deleterious substance.,,306 As Justice Thomas explained it, this passage was 
meant to guard against imposing absolute liability, but he continued in the same 
footnote: 
Nevertheless, we have referred to public welfare offenses as "dispensing 
with" or "eliminating" a mens rea requirement or "mental element" and have 
described them as strict liability crimes. While the use of the term "strict 
liability" is really a misnomer, we have interpreted statutes defining public 
welfare offenses to eliminate the requirement of mens rea; that is, the 
requirement of a "guilty mind" with respect to an element of a crime. Under 
such statutes we have not required that the defendant know the facts that 
make his conduct fit the definition of the offense.307 
This language hardly justifies the Fourth Circuit's broad assertion in 
Wi/son that in public welfare offenses "ignorance of the facts usually remains a 
defense,,,308 and most courts have not so read it.309 One cannot help but think 
that this overstatement had more to do with the Fourth Circuit's recognition 
that the Clean Water Act, there at issue, is undeniably a regulatory statute-
along with its disinclination to impose strict liability-than the court's inability 
to fairly read Staples. But this is the box in which courts find themselves. 
An even more disquieting interpretive development-at least for those 
committed to some semblance of interpretive consistency-are cases suggesting 
that statutes can, like a chameleon, change their character depending on their 
application. Thus, courts have held that the same statute can in some appli-
cations be public welfare-and thus impose strict liability-and in others be 
traditional, subject to the presumption of mens rea. This is another legacy of 
Staples, which without explanation held that the National Firearms Act when 
applied to machine guns (an enumerated "firearm" the unregistered possession 
305 See supra notes 268~9, 277. To be sure, the crimes that Justice Thomas in Staples 
seemed willing to recognize as "public welfare," and thus as a crime that provided for criminal 
punishment without proof of mens rea, seemed quite narrow. But it is this false dichotomy of 
presumptive, blame-based mens rea for all crimes except for this narrow category of public 
welfare crimes that lies at the bottom of Staples. 
306 Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600,607 n.3 (1994). 
307 I d. (citing Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246 (1952) and United States v. U.S. 
Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422 (1978)). 
308 Wilson, 133 F.3d at 263. 
309 See, e.g., United States v. Figueroa, 165 F.3d Ill, 116-17 (2d Cir. 1998). 
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of which was forbidden by the Act) was not a public welfare measure while 
conceding that when applied to hand grenades (another enumerated "fIrearm" 
and the subject of the Court's opinion in Freed) was a public welfare measure. 
The idea that the very same statutory term-here "firearm"-in the very same 
statute can have a different character and thus a different mens rea requirement 
depending on the particular "firearm" to which it is applied is at least curious, 
even recognizing that the term "firearm" is not under the statute one weapon 
but a list of several. But courts unenthusiastic about reading a mistake defense 
into this regulatory statute, at least as applied to weaponry which is facially "not 
innocent," have resorted to this way around the Staples dictate. So, the Eighth 
Circuit most recently in United States v. ErharPlo and the Ninth Circuit in 
United States v. Imes311 held that the Firearms Act as applied to a sawed-off 
shotgun (like machine guns and hand grenades, an enumerated "firearm" under 
the Act) does not require proof that a possessor knew that it had the character-
istics which caused it to be deemed a "firearm," that is, an overall length ofless 
than twenty-six inches or a barrel length less than eighteen inches. Other cir-
cuits, although presumably no more enthusiastic about allowing a mistake-of-
fact defense in such cases, have felt bound by Staples's holding and held that 
the government must prove knowledge of these defining characteristics.312 
One cannot help but think that such a cavalier disregard of Supreme Court 
precedent as demonstrated in Erhart and Imes is to some measure the result of 
the Court's willingness to disregard its own teachings and to impose its overly 
simplistic, presumptive construct on the federal courts as they work to discern 
the will of Congress in interpreting the ever growing body of regulatory crim-
inal statutes. To be sure, there are still cases in which the lower courts struggle 
to stay within the teachings of the Court and yet preserve a meaningful 
distinction between traditional crime and regulatory crime.313 However, even in 
310 415 F.3d 965 (8th Cir. 2005). 
311 80 F.3d 1309 (9th Cir. 1996). 
312 See United States v. Mains, 33 F.3d 1222, 1229 (lOth Cir. 1994); United States v. 
Starkes, 32 F.3d 100, 101 (4th Cir. 1994). 
313 See, e.g., United States v. Weintraub, 273 F.3d 139, 147-51 (2d Cir. 2001)(interpreting 
the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7413(c)(2000», to require proof only that the accused knew that 
he was dealing with asbestos, but not that the asbestos was of the kind or quantity that would 
trigger the regulatory workplace standard); United States v. Figueroa, 165 F.3d Ill, 115-16 (2d 
Cir. 1998) (interpreting the Alien Re-Entry Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1327 (1996) (current version at 8 
U.S.C. § 1327 (2000» to require proof that the accused knew that the alien whose entry he had 
facilitated was legally excludable from the United States). Even here, the analysis is crimped, 
the respective courts being forced by Supreme Court precedent largely to forego a full notice 
analysis. 
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these cases, the courts find themselves hamstrung, unable to escape the Court's 
short-circuiting of the notice analysis. 
If one is of the view that mens rea is an essential predicate to all criminal 
punishment, then Liparota, Staples, and RatzlaJ are more than half of the loaf. 
Although liability without fault still survives, the Court's adoption of "innocent 
conduct" as the principal, if not sole, criterion of statutory construction 
regarding mens rea goes a long way towards eliminating federal strict-liability 
crimes. Maybe in this era of often draconian sentences under the Federal Sen-
tencing Guidelines, this development is a good thing.314 But the possibility that 
in a particular instance Congress might opt for an excuse-free criminal sanction 
to protect the public from what it sees as a substantial threat to public safety is 
effectively lost in this jurisprudence. The Court has simply erected a mens rea 
construct that no longer permits that legislative judgment to take effect, 
effectively imposing its will over that of Congress, all in the name of statutory 
construction. At least from the perspective of the democratic process and 
legislative prerogative, that does not seem to be an altogether good thing. 
314 See generally Kennedy, supra note 52. 
